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Scaled Legislation and New Challenges
in Statutory Interpretation
Jill M. Fraley'
INTRODUCTION
T his article seeks to address an unexamined conflict between a
traditional principle of statutory interpretation, the presumption in
favor of the greatest common good, and the developing norms of clear
statement rules, which integrate foundational constitutional values such as
federalism into the interpretive canon. Historically, interpretive practices
of the Supreme Court have fluctuated in response to major shifts in the
structure of the federal government, such as the New Deal era expansion
and rights revolution development of the regulatory state.' Such shifts in
structure happened concurrently with adaptations of the federal legislative
process to emerging social problems and governmental relationships.3 This
article highlights another important and often overlooked shift in federal
governance structures and the legislative process-the movement toward
routinely legislating at the federal level for regions, defined as scales smaller
than the national but larger than a single state.
This trend in lawmaking introduces new conundrums for statutory
interpretation by complicatingour initial instincts to understand thecommon
good in the context of our federal structure where federal legislation is
i Assistant Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. Thanks are
due to many colleagues who have read drafts of this article along the way, including Bob Gor-
don, Al Brophy, William Buzbee, Emily Meazell, Lisa Pruitt, Amy Stein, and participants at
the William & Mary Faculty Workshop. I very much appreciate the research assistance of John
Eller, Emily Walters, and Marc Zappala.
2 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HArv. L. REv. 405,408-
09 (1989) (tracing fluctuations in statutory interpretation methodologies to major shifts in
legislative practices).
3 Abbe Gluck has argued that "federal courts do not seem to think of statutory interpre-
tation methodology as 'law....' Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodol-
ogy as 'Law' andthe Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 19oi (2010). This approach has allowed
courts greater political fluctuation in statutory interpretation and, although the price for this
is potentially political entanglements, the advantage is the ability of courts to rapidly adapt as
Congress changes the nature of legislation.
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traditionally directed to the national level and state legislation to the local
level. Scaled legislation-my term for federal legislation conceptualized at
a scale other than national-allows the federal government to efficiently
target specific or contextualized social problems, such as those that affect
only the southwest border, mountainous areas, river basins, and so forth.
On the other hand, scaled legislation, I argue, is uniquely positioned to
generate ambiguities in terms of the scale at which goods are intended
to be prioritized. Such legislation often has not only direct local benefits
but also indirect (or second-order) national benefits. As a consequence of
the necessary coalition building in our federalist legislative process, the
concerns for regional and local goods that prompt scaled legislation are
proportionately less likely to be explicitly prioritized on the face of the
bill than the indirect, second-order national benefits. Even when national
goods are intended to fall to the second order in federal legislation, such
intent may be latent in the text and could be either clear or ambiguous in
the legislative history.
This article is intended to provide the legal history necessary to
illuminate this trend in legislation and to outline parameters for a
discussion of its consequences for statutory interpretation. The discussion
here focuses on how ambiguities of scale in the common good interact with
recent trends toward instilling federalist structures within the interpretive
canon. I suggest that these trends may converge uncomfortably to create
a presumption that, even without apparent textual ambiguity, location-
specific legislation should be interpreted to serve the national scale. The
problem is counterintuitive: courts have increasingly protected state
interests and the federalism balance through incorporating a federalism
canon into the process of statutory interpretation.4 Yet when applied in
conjunction with the common good, the federalism canon may subvert
the intent behind legislation aimed at geographically specific goods and
instead focus priorities at the national level.
This article begins in Part I with a brief legal history of legislating
for the common good. In this history, I explain that until the early 1960s,
members of Congress balked at the idea of legislating for one particular
area of the country despite the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority
in the 1930s. Such legislation was seen as the quintessential pork barrel,
something that might be occasionally suffered as an appendage to a bill
but could never be the focus of legislation. Congress occasionally acted
to provide location-specific projects (such as lighthouses) that were
closely tied to a greater good (such as safe travel by sea) but hesitated to
legislate on more general terms for location-specific social problems such
4 This federalism canon is meant to guard at the outer limits of Congress's power by
requiring a clear statement of congressional intent. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEG-
ISLATIVE AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 367 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing "[tlhe substantive can-
ons designed to protect state authority from federal encroachment").
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as unemployment and poverty. Indeed, until the 1960s, there does not
seem to have been a great deal of recognition of the substantial spatialities
of socioeconomic issues across the country. By the early 1960s, however,
federal agencies and advisors developed an appreciation for the fluctuating
unevenness of socioeconomics and the geographically disparate impacts of
federal spending. These developments generated a steady flow of location-
specific legislation, which, although a significant change to congressional
practice, received far less attention than other developments that fit more
fluidly with the emerging rights emphasis. The focus on rights obscured
attention to location-specific legislation, which tended to be viewed as
though each piece of legislation was a one-off.
In Part II, I trace the central approaches to statutory interpretation,
focusing on the specific role of the substantive canons. I examine in detail
the canon of the common good along with the more recent innovation
of applying constitutional structures, particularly federalism, within the
process of interpretation. The article focuses on establishing historical
foundations and contemporary arguments to elucidate how these canons
may interact with scale.
In Part III, I consider the problem of ambiguities of scale and the
common good. I argue that while such ambiguities have been an issue,
the problem is amplified by a recent trend toward instilling constitutional
structures within the interpretive canon. The substantive canon of
federalism may converge uncomfortably with the substantive canon of
legislating for the common good to create a presumption that, without
apparent textual ambiguity, even location specific legislation should be
interpreted to serve the common good at the national scale.
Simply put, Congress often legislates for geographically discrete areas
and does not necessarily do so in furtherance of the national common
good, or at least not directly. Congress recognizes and acts to correct social
problems of smaller scales-either acting for the local good specifically or,
in many cases, pursuing a dual purpose of both generating local goods and
indirectly improving the national common good through increased equality.
Unfortunately, in the latter case, the direct and indirect goals occasionally
collide. In the case of dual-purpose legislation, overlaying the federalist
framework onto the substantive common good canon would result in
consistently privileging the national result.
If no recourse is made to the question of the intended scale of the
common good, the presumption may consistently favor subverting local
goods in favor of national ones, even while Congress directly legislated for
the local good and only indirectly addressed the common good; a lack of
textual ambiguity would confine the inquiry to the substantive canons and
the legislative text.
Part IV examines the legislative history of the Tennessee Valley
Authority to demonstrate how-as a historical and procedural matter-
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geographically specific legislation is particularly inclined to suggest
ambiguities of scale. This history demonstrates how such latent ambiguities
may further geographic inequalities.
Finally, the Conclusion offers some guidance for both interpreting
and crafting geographically specific legislation to avoid the problems of
ambiguities of scale. I suggest that the substantive interpretive canon
should carry the weight of the constitutional structure only where there is
a question of constitutionality of a provision and not in the more general
case of an inquiry regarding competing interpretations. Where there is
a location-specific legislative text, I suggest that courts must look to the
missing element of scale, particularly in the context of determining the
common good. I propose that if courts incorporate federalism into statutory
interpretation on questions beyond constitutionality, they are likely to
distort location-specific legislation by assuming that the common good is
evaluated at the national level; in doing so, this might open the way to
additional geographic inequalities through uneven distributions of burdens.
In addition, I recognize the possibility of using such latent ambiguities
of scale in the common good-when explicitly recognized-as a method
of generating dialogue between the courts and Congress on how statutory
interpretation might intersect with our continuing explorations of the
nature of federalism. To that end, I suggest not only interpretive adaptations
but also responsive, legislative ones. Location-specific legislation should
be textually explicit about the scale of public goods being contemplated
and the order of priorities if common goods are being distributed across
multiple scales, directly or indirectly.
I. A LEGAL HISTORY OF LEGISLATING FOR THE COMMON GOOD
I begin with some legislative history to contextualize the increasing
trend of scaled legislation. The introduction of the Appalachian Regional
Commission legislation provides a solid starting point for examining the
arguments against scaled legislation and the trends in legislation to that
point in time.
A. The ARC: Is Scaled Legislation Geographically Discriminatory?
When the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) Act was proposed
in 1964, Representative William C. Cramer of Florida expressed his outrage,
saying, "I can't imagine why anybody would want to vote for discriminatory
legislation like this."5 As reporter Marshall McNeil explained in the
Washington Daily News, "[The detractors'] principal protest is that 'it
would provide preferential treatment for one region of the U.S. and thereby
5 Appalachia Aid Bill Gets Approval ofHouse Panel, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Jul. 31, 1964,
at 15.
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discriminate against other areas which have equally great unemployment
and lack of economic development.' ' 6 This view was also included in the
Public Works Committee's review of the bill.7 These responses to the ARC
bill demonstrate just how much Congress viewed the undertaking as a new
type of legislative initiative.
Notably, Congress spoke in terms of discrimination and inequalities
rather than of the pork barrel. Pork barrel politics, the practice of targeting
federal benefits to specific voters to gain political goodwill,8 differed
from Congress's new legislative initiative in three critical respects. First,
rather than reaching across many states, pork barrel tended to focus on
"district-level benefits," particularly "new, highly visible" benefits such
as highway construction, in order to be effective at gaining votes in
Congress.9 Indeed, the literature of political science has tended to identify
and track pork barrel as specifically "district-level" benefits.'0 Therefore,
pork barrel generally represented local level federal spending within a
specific district-often on projects that were a part of a national network of
goods, such as interstates, post offices, railroads, and the national defense.
Pork barrel was a particularly effective means of building political capital
because "[i]t [was] rarely necessary for a member of Congress to create a
new program in order to provide. their constituents program benefits.""
Pork barrel, therefore, required less energy to accomplish and attracted less
unwanted attention. Pork barrel represents precisely this type of localized
redirecting of federal benefits within an overall federal scheme, often using
grant award programs.
Second, pork barrel spending can be substantially tied to political power
in Congress, particularly things such as seniority, leadership, and district
population.iz These benefits are obtained not because of a demonstration
of a particular need of one local area, but because of a particular member's
6 Marshall McNeil, LBJ Pushes Appalachia Bill, WASH. DAILY NEWS, Aug. IO, 1964.
7 Rep. of Comm. on Pub. Works to Accompany H.R. 1 1946, Appalachian Regional De-
velopment Act of 1964, H.R. REP. No. 88-1641, at 25-26 (July 31, 1964), in Aides Files, Office
Files of Richard N. Goodwin, Box 27, Lyndon B. Johnson Library [hereinafter Rep. Comm.
on Pub. Works).
8 See Alessandro Lizzeri & Nicola Persico, The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative
Electoral Incentives, 91 AM. EcoN. REV. 225, 225-26 (2001) (stating that politicians tend to favor
pork barrel legislation because politicians can specifically target the benefits that flow from
this legislation to voters).
9 Robert M. Stein & Kenneth N. Bickers, CongressionalElections and the Pork Barrel, 56 J.
POL. 377, 379-80 (1994).
to See id. at 379-80 (reviewing literature on the relationship between election results and
pork barrels, noting measures of district-level benefits).
II Id. at 381.
12 See id. at 379 (reviewing studies showing relationship between influence and access
to pork barrel).
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"influence."' 3 As a result, an area such as Appalachia with less prominent
members of Congress likely would not receive pork barrel. (Indeed, even
after the creation of the ARC, federal spending in Appalachia per capita has
remained a small fraction of the national norm. 4 ).
Finally, pork barrel projects fall within national scale programs, which
function as simple re-directions of spending within larger frameworks such
as those directed to transportation or the national defense. At the local level,
these benefits manifest as specific spending for a single project (building a
highway, a new postal facility, a new railway bridge, etc.) rather than as part
of any socio-economic program.
In contrast to pork barrel projects, the ARC was not local in scale but
rather crossed eight to thirteen states, had no ties to particularly powerful
members of Congress, and embarked on an integrated regional plan for
socio-economic improvements. These features typify scaled legislation,
not pork barrel, and presented a substantial deviation from previous
legislation, which members of Congress had to justify as they approved
the program.
Historically, more programmatic social goods tended to be directed to
the nation as a whole.'" With few and notable exceptions, the norm has
continued to be social legislation addressed to the national common good
such as the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906),16 the Federal Reserve Act
(1913),' 7 the Federal Farm Loan Act (1916)," the Oil Pollution Act (1924), 9
the Settlement of War Claims Act (1928),z ° the Migratory Bird Conservation
13 Id.
14 In a letter to the editor published in the New York Times, Al Smith, then Federal Co-
Chairman of the ARC, wrote, "Federal records show that in 1965 Federal per capita expendi-
tures in Appalachia were only sixty percent of those for the rest of the U.S. Today, Appalachia's
share is still below eighty percent." Al Smith, Letter to the Editor, Progress in Shortchanged
Appalachia, N.Y. 'TIMES, Oct. 15, I98I, at A26.
15 President Roosevelt's New Deal programs are commonly cited as social goods direct-
ed to the nation as a whole. One category of exceptions, however, is for the addition of specific
areas of land to the tax base through purchase, agreements with (or legal superseding of) tribal
authorities, or the creation of arable/habitable land through land/water interventions. See, e.g.,
Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 641 (2oo6))
(granting public lands to individuals in return for irrigation of the land); Newlands Reclama-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 43 U.S.C.) (funding irrigation projects to make portions of western states arable); Pueblo
Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 68-253,43 Stat. 636 (1924) (appropriating Pueblo lands).
16 Pure Food and Drug Act of 19o6, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768.
17 Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (substantially amended
and codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 342, 360 (2006)).
18 Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-158, ch. 245, 39 Stat. 360.
19 Oil Pollution Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-238, 43 Stat. 604.
20 Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-122, 45 Stat. 254.
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Act (1929),1 the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938),2 the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (1938),23 the Public Health Service Act (1944),24 the
Federal Tort Claims Act (1946),25 and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (1948).26 Social goods were often distributed to localities-but in ways
that applied to all of the states equally, such as the Capper-Ketchum Act
(providing for the development of agricultural extension programs)2 and
the Davis-Bacon Act (requiring the payment of locally prevailing wages to
workers on federally funded public works).28
While the TVA notably slipped through during the Depression Era,
its success was directly related to both Roosevelt's personal appeal for the
cause and his argument that the TVA was an experiment that, if successful,
would be replicated across the country.29 Similarly, the Hoover Dam
appeared to slip through the cracks after having been nixed repeatedly
for favoring certain states above others. The Hoover Dam's success likely
stemmed from a creative new use of the interstate compact, which had
previously been used essentially as a contract between two states rather
than an agreement among many about a contested issue.3"
A few other seeds were sown for the ARC by federal programs formed
by geographical features. In 1824, the Rivers and Harbors Act provided
for the Army Corps of Engineers to increase the navigability of the Ohio
and Mississippi Rivers-a move strongly directed toward encouraging
frontier settlement.3 The Mississippi River Flood Control Act of 1928
authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to work to control rising waters.32
21 Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929, ch. 257,45 Stat. 1222 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. § 715 (2oo6)).
22 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. io6o (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 201-19 (2006)).
23 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301-399d (2006)).
24 Public Health Service Act of 1944, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 262 (2006)).
25 Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946, ch. 753, 6o Stat. 842 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (2006)).
26 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (codi-
fied as scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
27 Capper-Ketchum Act, Pub. L. No. 70-475, 45 Stat. 711 (1928).
28 Davis-Bacon Act, ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §
3141-3148 (2006)).
29 See infra Part IV for a discussion of Roosevelt's theory of the TVA as a replicable
experiment.
30 FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE
1925, 32 (195 1) (generally classifying an interstate compact as a contract).
31 River and Harbor Act of 1824, ch. 139, 4 Stat. 32 (1824).
32 Flood Control Act of 1928, ch. 569, 45 Stat. 534 (1928) (codified as scattered sections
of 33 U.S.C.) (describing programs related to river navigation that also specifically tied in with
national defense initiatives, which favored the creation of multiple methods of rapid inland
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Other legislation brought to rural areas benefits that were previously
enjoyed primarily by city dwellers, such as electrification and efficient
postal service.33 While multi-state in application, these initiatives were
tied narrowly to a specific goal rather than greater programmatic social
objectives, which remained strongly national in their outlook.
Against this norm, Congress and the Johnson Administration struggled
to enact the Appalachian Regional Commission.3 4 Some members of
Congress were simply unable to accept this type of programming as a
part of the congressional legislative mandate. A Public Works Committee
Report of 1964 expresses many of these ideas: "No one is in favor of
poverty .... [But] the program is clearly inadequate and not in the public
interest."35 Members of Congress objected to the Bill on the grounds that it
would "provide preferential treatment for one region of the United States
and thereby discriminate against other areas of the Nation which have
equal or greater unemployment and lack of economic development. '36
Spending on social programs to benefit solely one region was severely
criticized: "A Federal program to benefit all of the citizens of the United
States is one thing. A Federal program to benefit some or all of the citizens
of one selected area or a few selected States simply because of their place
of residence is an entirely different thing. '37 The highway portion of the
bill was described as "particularly discriminatory against portions of the
Nation outside Appalachia."38 Another section was described as having "an
enormously damaging potential for other regions of the United States."39
Proponents of the bill responded not with denials of the charges (which
were roughly accurate) but with justifications based on Appalachia's unique
needs and position. Indeed, the President's Appalachian Commission,
which had recommended the creation of the Appalachian Regional
transportation of military personnel and supplies).
33 See, e.g., Rural Electrification Act of 1936, ch. 432 , 49 Stat. 1363 (1936) (providing for
the furnishing of electric energy to rural areas); Rural Post Roads Act of 1916, ch. 241, 39 Stat.
355 (1916) (providing that the United States will aid individual states in the construction of
rural post roads). Congress confirmed its commitment to providing rural mail delivery, man-
dating that "[riural mail delivery shall be extended so as to serve, as nearly as practicable, the
entire rural population of the United States." Act of July 28, ch. 261, 39 Stat. 412, 423 (1916).
34 Notably, the Area Redevelopment Act had been passed in 1961, likely laying some
precedent for the Appalachian Regional Commission Act. See Area Redevelopment Act, Pub.
L. No. 87-27, 75 Stat. 47 (1961). The ARA was easily distinguishable in that it dispersed funds
across the country, only directing them specifically to cities and rural areas that faced eco-
nomic challenges and unemployment. See id. at 47-50 (designating as "redevelopment areas"
those places that satisfied the Act's criteria, including that "substantial and persistent unem-
ployment" has existed in the area for an extended time).
35 Rep. Comm. on Pub. Works, supra note 7, at 25.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 26.
38 Id. at 38.
39 Id. at 41.
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Commission, opened its Report with the claim that "Appalachia is a region
apart-geographically and statistically."4 This approach continued through
the legislative process. The Committee on Public Works Report on the
bill explained, "In these times of general prosperity, many of the people of
Appalachia exist at a level significantly below the national average.
41
Proponents of theAppalachian bill also addressed the claim of geographic
discrimination by noting how the program would indirectly benefit the
national common good. This argument was framed in terms of either the
"drain" of Appalachia on national resources or the idea of growing the tax
base and national economy. A press release by the Committee on Public
Works quoted Congressman Robert E. Jones: "The aim of the Appalachia
project is to ... take people off doles and make them taxpayers."4 The
Appalachian Regional Commission would itself continue this argument,
citing as a central planning goal the "area's role in the American economy
of the future."43 While this view garnered some support, others saw more
of a trade-off with federal spending on "regional development" directly
connected to at least a partial "reduction in national economic growth."'
Both arguments might have failed but for a much broader trend of
recognizing the spatialities of governing across a vast territory. Even
without looking specifically at Appalachia, the federal government realized
that "[t]he failure of certain geographic regions to participate in the overall
national prosperity has become a major domestic problem. '45
Claims of discrimination proved less forceful against the realization that
the federal government had already been spending unequally at the local
level-and particularly neglecting Appalachia in its spending, although
no one had noticed.4 6 Prior to the Employment Act of 1946, Congress
40 Rep. of the President's Appalachian Regional Commission xv, in Presidential Papers,
Box 264, Lyndon B. Johnson Library; see also Rep. Comm. on Pub. Works, supra note 7, at I
(using this same opening line at the beginning of the report).
41 Rep. Comm. on Pub. Works, supra note 7, at 2.
42 Press Release, Comm. on Pub. Works, Chairman of the House Committee on Public
Works Names Robert E. Jones Chairman of the Subcommittee on Appalachian Regional
Development (Jan. 22, 1965), in Aides Files, Office Files of Richard N. Goodwin, Box 27,
Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
43 APPALACHIAN REG'L COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1967), in Presidential Papers, Box
264, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
44 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT STUDY BOARD ON THE REGION-
AL EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AND RELATED POLICIES xi (Dec. 1967), in Aides
Files, Files of James Gaither, Box 41, Lyndon B. Johnson Library [hereinafter REP. OF THE
INDEP. STUDY BD.I.
45 Id. at vi.
46 See PRESIDENT'S APPALACHIAN REG'L COMM'N, APPALACHIA 28 (1964) ("[Tlotal Federal
investment in Appalachia has not been proportionate to either the population or its needs.),
available at http://www.arc.gov/about/ARCAppalachiaAReportbythePresidentsAppalachian-
RegionalCommission1964.asp; id. at 29 fig.15 (describing the "federal expenditures gap" in
Appalachia).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
had paid little attention to how federal spending fit into the national and
local economic pictures. The problem was that "[diespite the importance
of Government procurement to the national economy, little was known
of the immediate and subsequent impacts of this procurement upon
the individual regions of the United States. '47 However, the 1946 Act
generated an increasing trend of investigation and concern with the federal
government's role in the national economy, as well as the interrelation
between the national, state, and local economies. 48 By the beginning of
the 1960s, the federal government was specifically investigating the
geographical impacts of its spending practices.49 Government contracts,
particularly those for military defense spending, were questioned publicly
for their role in providing unequal federal support to local economies with
the release of the Report of the Committee on the Economic Impact of
Defense and Disarmament. 0
Once the details of military spending were out, the Johnson
Administration moved to make a more general assessment of how the
federal social and economic programs impacted the local communities. The
Office of Economic Opportunity, headed by Sargent Shriver, undertook
this research project and produced a final report in 1967.1 This project was,
in the words of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), "a probe into a
hitherto unexplored frontier-one in which, for the first time, a semblance
of order and system is beginning to evolve."5" The resulting report not only
detailed federal spending in each state but also presented those numbers
comparatively so that each state was ranked against the others in terms of
federal spending.53 The report went beyond reviewing federal spending
as a whole to examine how each state fared in terms of spending by the
various federal departments and agencies. 54
The report, which detailed spending in OEO programs as of April 1967,
also demonstrated how Appalachia was faring in terms of various "war on
47 REP. OF THE INDEP. STUDY BD., supra note 44, at vi.
48 See Salma J. Mushkin & Robert F. Adams, Emerging Patterns of Federalism, 19 NAT'L
TAx J. 225, 225-47 (1966).
49 Id.
50 See Memorandum from Cyrus Vance to Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson on the Estimated
Obligations of the Department of Defense Programs Affecting the Appalachian Region (Dec.
16, 1965), in Presidential Files, Confidential File, Box 6 (1 of 2), Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
51 See OFFICE OF ECON. OPPORTUNITY, SUMMARY OF FEDERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PRO-
GRAMS: A REPORT OF FEDERAL PROGRAM IMPACT ON THE LOCAL COMMUNITY (1966), in Aides
Files, Office Files of Fred Bohen, Box 3, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
52 Id. (quoting the first page of the introduction of the report).
53 See id.
54 See id. While the Administration began by investigating defense spending because of
the comparative impact of this spending, the project quickly expanded not only to other de-
partmental spending, but also to measure how well new socio-economic programs were faring
in terms of distributing goods to those most in need.
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poverty" and other poverty initiatives, which were supposedly focused on
the region."5 For example, as of 1967, Kentucky was ranked fifteenth in
funds for Community Action Programs and eleventh in funds for VISTA
Volunteer Programs. While Kentucky has 120 counties, only eighty-eight
had HeadStart Programs, only twelve had Small Business Loan Programs,
and VISTA volunteers served in only twenty-two.5 6
Uneven federal spending as a cause of failings in the Appalachian
economy justified discrete spending in Appalachia, especially when this
information was combined with research on the severity of poverty in the
region.57 As a progress report of the Appalachian Regional Commission
explained at the close of 1965, when the federal government became
interested in poverty in the region during the 1960s, "the first step was the
investigation and analysis of the region's advantages and disadvantages....
[T]he first picture was of the region as a whole in relation to the rest of the
country.' ' 5 In the face of this evidence, the arguments against spending in
Appalachia were much less convincing. The ARC Act's detractors no longer
had the concept of fairness on their side.
Drawing on this history of unequal spending through government
contracts and facilities, Johnson was able to push his ARC Act-which
featured extensive local spending directed to particular socioeconomic
problems-proclaiming "the pork barrel is over."5 9
B. Scaled Legislation in Recent Years
Building on this history of awareness of the spatialities of social
problems and the precedent of the ARC, Congress increasingly looked
to scales outside the federalist dichotomy to address modern problems in
efficient ways.
In recent years, the area-specific phenomenon, or what I call scaled
legislation, has grown enormously. Legislation has repeatedly targeted
multi-state areas of the country such as "National Heritage Areas," 6° the
55 See id. Notably, it is arguable whether the war on poverty was focused on Appalachia.
On its face, the program was national rather than regional, and the data described here
supports that view-with Appalachian areas not disproportionately represented.
56 See id.
57 Not everyone appreciated the argument. Detractors suggested that, "Itihis preferen-
tial treatment is 'justified' by statistics which purport to show that Appalachia lags behind
national averages in several categories." Rep. Comm. on Pub. Works, supra note 7, at 27.
58 Letter from Ralph R. Widner, Exec. Dir., Appalachian Reg'l Comm'n, to Co-Chairs
of the Appalachian Reg'l Comm'n (Jan. 13, 1966), in Presidential Files, Box 384, Lyndon B.
Johnson Library, (carbon-copied to the President with attached report).
59 JAMES BRANSCOME, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN APPALACHIA 8 (1977).
60 See, e.g., National Heritage Areas Act of 2oo6, Pub. L. No. 109-338, 12 Stat. 178 (2oo6)
(codified as scattered titles of U.S.C.).
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"Mississippi River Basin,' 61 and the Mississippi River6 along with "forest
and rangeland" regions 63 and other areas that meet a statutory definition"
of "rural,"6 "wilderness," 66 "urban,"67 "wetlands," 68 "deepwater ports" 69 or
"coastal zones.1 70
Other recent pieces of legislation target the Colorado River Basin, 71 the
Outer Continental Shelf,7" the Caribbean Basin region,73 the "High Plains
61 See, e.g., Upper Mississippi River Basin Protection Act, H.R. 3671, 11 ith Corig. (2010).
62 See, e.g., Mississippi River Protection and Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 4686, io8th
Cong. (2004); S. 2470, io8th Cong. (2004); Mississippi River Corridor Study Commission Act
of 1989, Pub. L. No. Ioi-398, io4 Stat. 855 (1990).
63 See, e.g., Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Research Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-307, 92 Stat. 353 (codified as scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
64 Where an area is not specifically targeted through a statutory definition, some statutes
will apply, by default, only to certain cross-state regions. See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (affecting primarily states surface
coal mining operations, such as West Virginia, Kentucky, Virginia and Pennsylvania) (codified
as scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
65 For example, the Crime Control Act of 199o provided special financial assistance for
drug enforcement in rural states. See Crime Control Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. Ioi-647, § 8ol,
104 Stat. 4789, 4825-26 (codified as scattered sections Of 42 U.S.C.). The Act defined a "rural
state" as a "State that has a population density of fifty-two or fewer persons per square mile
or a State in which the largest county has fewer than one hundred and fifty thousand people."
Id. at 4825. Similarly, the Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-313,
92 Stat. 365 (codified as scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.) provided resources specifically for
non-federally owned "rural" forest land, such as incentive programs, fire control, and so forth.
Other examples include the Rural Crisis Recovery Program Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-2 19,
oi Stat. 1456 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2661); Rural Health Clinics Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-
194, 97 Stat. 1345 (codified as scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); and Rural Law Enforcement
Assistance Act of 2001, H.R. 1348, 107th Cong. (2001).
66 See, e.g., Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified as scattered
sections of 16 U.S.C.); Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-622, 88 Stat. 2o96 (codified as scat-
tered sections of 16 U.S.C.); Endangered American Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
237, 92 Stat. 40 (codified as scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
67 See, e.g., Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302 (codi-
fied as scattered titles of U.S.C.), amendedby Act of Nov. I6, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-187, §§ 1-2,
17-18, 91 Star. 1385, 1385-86 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1613).
68 See, e.g., Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-645, 1oo Stat.
3582 (codified as scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
69 See, e.g., Deepwater Port Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-419, 98 Stat. 1607
(amending the Deepwater Port Act of 1974) (codified as scattered titles of U.S.C.).
70 Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat.
1013 (codified as scattered titles of U.S.C.); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 128o (codified as scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
71 Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat. z66 (1974)
(codified as scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
72 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372,92 Stat.
629 (codified as scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
73 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, §§ 211-30, 97 Stat. 369,
384-97 (1983) (codified as scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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States,"7 4 the Chesapeake Bay watershed area,7" the Northwest Straits
area,76 the Delaware River Basin," and the San Juan Basin area.78 A recurring
favorite is the "United States-Mexico Border Region"79 or the "Southwest
Border region.""0 For more than a decade, Senator Jeff Bingaman of New
Mexico has introduced multiple bills to create a regional authority focused
on public Works and economic development in the southwest border area.8
Some such regional programs are explicitly designed to mirror the
structure and mission of the Appalachian Regional Commission. For
example the Delta Regional Authority was established in 2000 and covers
252 counties and parishes across eight states (Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee); this structure
is similar to the structure of the ARC.
82
A similar proposal was made for the Northern Great Plains Rural
Development Authority.83 While specific legislation for this Authority
74 High Plains States Groundwater Demonstration Program Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-
434, 98 Stat. 1675 (1984) (codified as scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
75 H.R. 1652, 112th Cong. (2011) (amending the Water Resources Development Act of
1996 to "make modifications to the Chesapeake Bay environmental restoration and protection
program") (as referred to the Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env't, Apr. 18, 2011).
76 Northwest Straits Marine Conservation Initiative Act, Pub. L. No. 105-384, §§ 401-05,
112 Stat. 3451, 3458-59 (1998).
77 Delaware River Basin Conservation Act of 2011, H.R. 2325, I izth Cong. (201i) (as
referred to the Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env't, June 24, 201 i).
78 San Juan Basin Wilderness Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-603, 98 Stat. 3155
(codified as scattered titles of U.S.C.).
79 See, e.g., United States-Mexico Border Regional Development Act of 1988, S. 1870,
I ost Cong. (1989); United States-Mexico Border Regional Development Act of 1989, H.R.
1679,1 Ist Cong. (1989).
80 See, e.g., H.R. 1922, 112th Cong. (2011) (as referred to the Subcomm. on Border and
Mar. Sec., June 2, 2oi); Border Security Enforcement Act of 201 1, S. 803, 11 zth Cong. (2011)
(as referred to Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov't Affairs, Apr. 13, 2011 ); see also Southern
Borderlands Public Safety Communications Act, H.R. 1277, 112th Cong. (2011) (as referred to
Subcomm. on Conservation, Energy, and Forestry, Apr. 8, 2011).
81 See Southwest Regional Border Authority Act, S. 458, xo8th Cong. (2003); Southwest
Regional Border Authority Act, S. 2522, 107th Cong. (2002). Other members of Congress have
sponsored or co-sponsored similar bills. See Southwest Regional Border Authority Act, H.R.
2068,1 i oth Cong. (2007) (proposed by Rep. Reyes with six co-sponsors); Southwest Regional
Border Authority Act, H.R. 1071, io8th Cong. (2003) (proposed by Rep. Reyes with a dozen
co-sponsors); Southwest Regional Border Authority Act, H.R. 4847, Io7th Cong. (2002) (pro-
posed by Rep. Reyes and five co-sponsors). Other bills have focused more narrowly on spe-
cific needs of the border region such as transportation or environmental issues. See, e.g., Bor-
der Infrastructure Safety and Congestion Relief Act of 1996, H.R. 3669, 104th Cong. (1996);
United States - Mexico Border Environmental Protection Act, S. 281, 103d Cong. (1993).
82 Delta Regional Authority Act of zooo, Pub. L. No. 1o6-554, § 382B, 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-26 9 -7 4. See DRA Counties and Parishes Maps, DELTA REGIONAL AUTHORITY, http://www.
dra.gov/about-us/eight-state-map.aspx (last updated 2012) (showing map of coverage area for
the commission).
83 Northern Great Plains Rural Development Authority Act, S. 1681, 107th Cong. (2001).
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lingered endlessly in Congress, the Authority was later established under
the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002. The Authority focuses
on "acquiring and developing land" and "carrying out other economic
development activities" including highway construction.' The funding is
centrally allocated to "serve the needs of distressed counties and isolated
areas of distress in the region.""5
Other areas of the country continue to seek similar legislation. Recent
proposals include the Northeast Regional Development Commission,86 the
Southern Regional Commission,87 the Gulf Coast Region Redevelopment
Commission,8  and the Northern Border Region. 9 In 2002, an "Authority"
was proposed for the "SouthEast Crescent Region," citing, just as
proponents of the Appalachian bill did, the "special needs" of the area.90
Finally, in response to the BP oil spill, legislation had been directed to the
"Gulf" zone, as well as to the specific multi-state area affected by the spill.9
While legislation has remained true to Herbert Wechsler's famous
characterization-"interstitial"g-these programs have evolved to become
much more tailored than the ARC. In direct contrast to the ARC, which
includes broad directives, the regional commissions listed above have
developed objectives that instead focus on designated sub-national spaces
for specific federal programs through individual pieces of legislation.
Some areas of law particularly inspire scalar solutions. In environmental
law, one approach suggests that "governance and the provision of public
goods by authorities" should be at the "geographic scale that encompasses
substantially all cost bearers and beneficiaries of the policy in question, but
[is] no broader."93 Environmental federalism-or the allocation of authority
84 Overview - Northern Great Plains Regional Authority, NGPLAINS.ORG (Nov. 4, 2007).
85 Id.
86 Northeast Regional Development Commission Act of 2005, H.R. 1695, 109th Cong.
(2005).
87 Southern Regional Commission Act of 2oo3, S. 527, io8th Cong. (2003).
88 Gulf Coast Region Redevelopment Commission Act, H.R. 4691, 1o9th Cong. (2006).
89 Northern Border Economic Development Commission Act of 2007, S. 2249, I ioth
Cong. (2007).
90 To Provide a Framework for Coordinating Federal, State, and Local Efforts to Meet
the Special Needs of the SouthEast Crescent Region, H.R. 3618, 1o7th Cong. (2002). The
Authority was re-proposed in 2005 in Senate Bill 1865 by Senator Elizabeth Dole of North
Carolina. SouthEast Crescent Authority Act of 2005, S. 1865, io9th Cong. (2005).
91 Implementing the Recommendations of the BP Oil Spill Commission Act of 2011,
H.R. 501, 112 th Cong. (2o1) (pending as of July II, 2012); Resources and Ecosystems Sus-
tainability, Tourist Opportunities, and Revived Economies of the Gulf Coast States Act of
2011, H.R. 3096, 112th Cong. (zo i) (pending as of July 11,2012).
92 HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 435 (ist ed. 1953) ("Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies
a legal field completely, totally excluding all participation by the legal systems of the states.").
93 Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495,
152 4 n.88 (i999).
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between states and the federal government-has continually been a
question at the very heart of the field with scholars adopting a number of
conflicting approaches. 94 In an effort to address this debate-and to respond
to cross-jurisdictional environmental issues9S-we have creatively adopted
scales of governance that are neither federal, nor state, but rather regional.96
Federal legislation now often focuses on specific multi-state regions. For
example, the Highlands Conservation Act, introduced in 2003, addresses
the "Highlands Region," which is defined as upland areas of Connecticut,
New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania; 97 a similar effort was proposed
for the forests of Maine, New Hampshire, New York and Vermont in the
Northern Forest Stewardship Act.98 Efforts have been in the works for
years to establish an environmental plan specific to the Southwest border.'
Regional governance crosses traditional jurisdictions of the states.100
Such creative and cross-jurisdictional governance mechanisms date back
at least to the Tennessee Valley Authority and have been viewed with
renewed interest since the Environmental Movement of the 1960s and
94 See id. at 1496 n.3-4. "Much of the recent debate about environmental governance and
regulatory reform has centered on the question of where we should lodge authority to address
environmental problems." Id. at 1496. Not everyone is excited about the debate, however.
Esty has argued that our many debates on environmental federalism are rather wasted be-
cause "[b]etter environmental results depend less on fine tuning theories of environmental
federalism than on improving regulatory performance," or in other words, "how we regulate is
more important than where we regulate." Id. at 1495.
95 See Marc J. Hershman & Craig W. Russell, Regional Ocean Governance in the United
States: Concept and Reality, i6 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoCY E 227, 238 (2006) (examining cross-
jruisdictional responses and "networks of responsibility" within regional economies).
96 See id. at 228 (discussing how new reports "emphasize new regional approaches in
the United States to strengthen our economies, sustain our ecoystem resources, preserve our
cultural and biogeophysical treasures, and shore up national security.").
97 Highlands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 1o8-42 1, 118 Stat. 2375 § 3 (2004).
98 Northern Forest Stewardship Act, H.R. 97 1, Ioth Cong. § 3(a) (1997).
99 See, e.g., United States-Mexico Border Environmental Protection Act, S. 281, io3d
Cong. (1993) (establishing specific environmental protections for the area).
Ioo The term "regional" is applied to a number of different scales that do not align with
the traditional federal-state categories. At times, "regional" is understood to be a scale greater
than the city, but smaller than the state; at other times as portions of multiple states; and other
authorities use the word to refer to groupings of multiple countries. Hershman & Russell, su-
pra note 95, at 239 ("In geography and metropolitan planning, the geographic scope of regions
is variable in scale and reflects the extent of common problems or interests. In some instances
region refers to towns, and in other situations it refers to whole nations.").
Within the United States, most often the term "regional" is used to describe less tra-
ditional levels of governance that are created to map the geographical bounds of either a
particular topographical feature, such as in the Tennessee Valley Authority, which matched
the Tennessee River watershed, or to a particular problem in need of governmental atten-
tion, such as the justification of the Appalachian Regional Commission in terms of a "unique"
poverty in the area.
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70s ' and President Lyndon B. Johnson's assorted research and policy
projects on the coordination of multiplying bureaucracies. 0°
More recently, both law and the social sciences have looked to
regional scales for solutions to modern social problems. Within public
policy literature, "[riegionalism has experienced a renaissance."' 103 A
similar resurgence of the concept of regional scales occurred within the
discipline of geography. 104 While regional solutions have been adopted for
many sociolegal problems such as water quality, waste management, and
transportation, advocates argue that regionalism could offer even more
substantial benefits and continue to press for legislative developments on
this front. 5
Regional level governments are advantageous in that they may
effectively deliver service within economies of scale. For example, oceanic
resource issues may be best tackled through "regional ocean governance"
through the creation of "regional stewards."'0 6 In planning and zoning
law, regional governance is being advocated and adopted to deal with
the regional impacts of modern trends in development, such as big box
development. 107 This trend follows that of local governments increasingly
consolidating certain functions at a regional level. 0 8 "At different levels and
across sectors, people are arguing for a new regional approach."'"°
ioi Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for one area to bear the brunt of environmen-
tal degradation while another area reaps the benefits. See, e.g., Andrew D. Thompson, Public
Health, Environmental Protection, and the Dormant Commerce Clause. Maintaining State Sovereignty
in the Federalist Structure, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 213, 213 (2004) (providing a discussion of
acid deposition and regionalism). The Appalachian Regional Commission's creation served as
a model for later calls for regional governance mechanisms. In 1978, Senator Jennings Ran-
dolph of West Virginia introduced Senate Bill 3626 "[t]o extend the Appalachian Regional
Development Act and to provide for a nationwide system of multistate regional development
commissions." S. 3626, 9th Cong. 2d Sess. (978).
102 See generally JILL M. FRALEY, BECOMING APPALACHIAN: LAW & GEOGRAPHY IN THE
MAKING OF APPALACHIA: 1930-1970 (publication forthcoming).
103 Victoria Basolo, US Regionalism and Rationality, 40 URB. STUD. 447, 447 (2003).
104 See generally Andrew Jonas, A New Regional Geography of Localities?, 2o AREA I o I (1988);
Andrew Sayer, The 'New' Regional Geography and Problems of Narrative, 7 ENV'T & PLANNING
D: Soc'Y & SPACE 253 (1989); Edward W. Soja, Regions in Context: Spatiality, Periodicity, and
the Historical Geography of the Regional Question, 3 ENV'T & PLAN. D: Soc'Y & SPACE 175 (1985).
105 See Basolo, supra note 103, at 448.
1o6 Hershman & Russell, supra note 95, at 264.
107 Patricia E. Salkin, Supersizing Small Town America: Using Regionalism to Right-Size Big
Box Retail, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 48,49-50 (2005) (stating that developers should use regionalism
techniques in building big box developments "to preserve small town quality of life and
maintain local economic boosts that big box stores offer communities.").
io8 See Joseph C. LaValley III, Showdown over Snake Mountain: How a New Local Govern-
ment Was Formedto Resolve a Land-Use Dispute, 65 ALB. L. REV. 475, 489 (2001) ("[M]any local
governments have regionalized such traditionally municipal services.").
IO9 Hershman & Russell, supra note 95, at 264. There is also, certainly, a good measure
of pessimism about the practical possibilities for regional governance in this country. See, e.g.,
[Vol. IOI
2012-2013] SCALED LEGISLATION AND NEW CHALLENGES 249
In many ways, the arguments for regionalism today significantly
mirror those offered by Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s: the existence of
cross-jurisdictional issues of modern life, the confusion resulting from a
multiplicity of small governmental bodies, and the efficiency of matching
governance to the scale of the problem."' For example, regional governance
has been justified in instances where local authorities have failed to provide
residents of all economic levels with housing, leading to "regionalism [as]
an essential component to a workforce housing strategy."'" More generally,
Laurie Reynolds argues for regionalism because "more than 80% of our
population now lives in what can be defined as metropolitan areas, with their
multiplicity of local government units and the corresponding overlapping
and intersecting boundary lines."' 2 The Obama Administration has
responded positively to these and other arguments, establishing the
Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program, which
encourages regional level solutions to cross-jurisdictional problems.113
For our purposes, there is no need to argue for or against regional models
of governance. The important point is simply that laws and governance
Myron Orfield, The Region and Taxation: School Finance, Cities, and the Hope for Regional Reform,
55 Burr. L. REV. 91, 92 (2007) ("[M]ost scholars and activists who believe in regional reform
are pessimistic about the prospects for reform.").
11o The Johnson Administration drew on the preliminary draft of a paper eventually
published in the National Tax Journal. See Selma J. Mushkin & Robert F Adams, Emerging
Patterns of Federalism, 19 NAT'L TAX J., 225, 225-30 (1966) (describing the need for intergov-
ernmental cooperation in light of multiple local governments dealing with sprawling metropo-
lises and interstate problems such as transportation and water).A copy of the preliminary draft
of this article is located in the Aides Files, Office Files of Frederick Panzer, Box 357, Lyndon
B. Johnson Presidential Archives. Selma J. Mushkin & Robert F. Adams, Emerging Patterns of
Federalism, (March 1966) (unpublished draft), reprinted in 19 NAT'L TAX J., 225 (1966). Simi-
lar sentiments are found in a pamphlet, produced by the administration for a Conference of
Governors on Federal-State Relations, held at the White House on March i8, 1967. The New
Federalism (1967), in Aides Files, Office Files of Charles Maguire, Box 3, Lyndon B. Johnson
Presidential Archives.
i i i Catherine Durkin, The Exclusionary Effect of "Mansionization": Area Variances Under-
mine Efforts to Achieve Housing Affordability, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 439, 465 (2OO6). For a general
discussion of new regionalism see Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropoli-
tan Equity, andthe New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93 (2003) (analyzing new regionalism and
explaining the underlying values of new regionalist arguments). See also Richard Briffault,
Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2000) (discussing the background of regionalism
and its core elements).
112 Laurie Reynolds, Home Rule, Extraterritorial Impact, and the Region, 86 DENY. U. L.
REV. 1271, 1272 (2009). Reynolds describes regionalism's central goal as "more equitable re-
source distribution across the metropolitan area." Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees Assessments,
Dues, and the "Get What You Pay For" Model ofLocal Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373,377 (2004).
1 13 For an examination of the grant program, see Lisa T Alexander, The Promise and
Perils of "New Regionalist" Approaches to Sustainable Communities, 38 FoaDRA URB. L.J. 629,
649-73, (201 1). There are, of course, substantial barriers to the new regionalist approach. See
Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the
Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2015-27 (2000).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
structures exist that do not match our federalist structures. While it is true
that "regional interests can and do play a role in legislative decisions," 1 4
increasingly there is a willingness to use a particular governance scale to
legislate for some unit that is less than the entire whole-generally to
address a discrete social or economic problem."'
II. APPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In light of the vast literature on the various philosophies of statutory
interpretation, the discussion here will be limited to a brief summary of the
matters most pertinent to the present inquiry. Additionally, the discussion
is developed with a historian's methodology, preferring primary over
secondary sources. Therefore, every effort has been made to rely more on
the words of the Justices and their own understandings of methodology
rather than on scholarly summaries or reflections.
The process of statutory interpretation is guided by a single principle:
"to give effect to Congress's intent."'1 6 This is the Court's "preeminent
purpose."" 7 The process of interpretation begins first with the statute's
text because we presume that Congress has made its intent most explicitly
clear within the text.11 8 As Justice Kagan remarked in Tapia v. United
States, the consideration of the matter begins with the specific text of the
congressional statute "and given the clarity of that provision's language,
could end there as well."" 9 As a simple summary, before reaching the
14 James R. Dalton, Note, Making Politics DeMinimis in the Political Process: The Unwork-
able Implications of Cox v. Larios in State Legislative Redistricting and Reapportionment, 2004 BYU
L. REv. 1999, 2042 (2004).
115 The greatest support may currently be for regional governance mechanisms that are
very narrowly tailored to a single issue. See Todd Swanstrom, Ideas Matter: Reflections on the New
Regionalism, 2 CITYSCAPE 5, 15 (1996), available at http://www.huduser.org/intercept.asp?loc=/
Periodicals/CITYSCPE/VOL2NUM2/swanstrom.pdf ("Clearly, the age of general-purpose
regional governments is past.").
116 Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Idahoan Fresh
v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 E3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998)). There are, of course, criticisms
of the purpose-centered approach. And while the purpose-centered approach may assume a
legislative process that is more fair and effective than the one that we have, I believe it is an
entirely different question as to whether the courts are the appropriate place to remedy such
systemic defects.
117 Standiferd v. United States, 641 F 3 d 1209, 1212 (roth Cir. 201 ).
118 See Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F3 d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Be-
cause it is presumed that Congress expresses its intent through the ordinary meaning of its
language, every exercise of statutory interpretation begins with plain language of the statute
itself.") (citing Santa Fe Med. Servs., Inc. v. Segal (In re Segal), 57 F3d 342,345 (3d Cir. 1995)).
i 19 Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (201i). Notably, courts are loath to look
beyond an unambiguous text to find congressional purposes. See Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473,
483 (198i) (noting that the Court would look beyond unambiguous language only in "rare and
exceptional" cases) (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, j87 (1978); United Air Lines, Inc. v.
McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 199 (1977) (stating that if a statute is unambiguous, then legislative
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point of methodological divergences, Justices first prefer the text. As
Justice Kennedy recently emphasized, "As we have repeatedly held, the
authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or
any other extrinsic material. Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory
interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting
Legislature's understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms."'
By focusing on the type of methodology (because statutory interpretation
is, by some accounts, methodology more than law'), approaches to
interpreting statutes can be roughly grouped into three canons: linguistic,
referential and substantive.' Roughly, these canons address three critical
questions. First, where may evidence of interpretation be found? Second,
what language rules or customs may be used to assist in interpretation?
Finally what are the foundational legal values that will function, roughly, as
trump cards in this process?
A. Linguistic Canons
A variety of linguistic canons are frequently consulted to aid in the
interpretation of a statute, generally without reference to anything outside
the text (and the canons). The Court will look to the "common-and in
context the most natural-definition of the word," often simply referencing
the meaning found in an ordinary dictionary;'23 apply "standard rules of
history is irrelevant). As Justice Rehnquist wrote, "where [Congress's] will has been expressed
in reasonably plain terms, 'that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."' Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 1oz, io8 (I98O).
The Eleventh Circuit recently explained that courts interpret and apply not congressional
purposes, but statutes. "[lit is not for us to substitute our view of policy for the legislation
which has been passed by Congress." Myers v. Toojay's Mgmt. Corp., 640 E3d 1278, 1286
(i ith Cit. 2011) (quoting Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 52
(2008)).
The Court follows this rule because "[ilnvocation of the 'plain purpose' of legislation at
the expense of the terms of the statute itself takes no account of the processes of compromise
and, in the end, prevents the effectuation of congressional intent." Id. (quoting Dimension
Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986)). Otherwise stated, the purpose of a statute may not be
so simple as, for example, economic recovery, but rather economic recovery achieved while
maintaining environmental quality standards. Much of the work of Congress is the balancing
of competing social goods.
1 2o Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546,568 (zoo5).
121 See Gluck, supra note 3, at 1902.
122 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Constructed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-o6 (1950) (explor-
ing and critiquing the variety of methods of statutory interpretation and assigning them to
categories).
123 Tapia, 13I S.Ct. at 2388. While this approach might be thought to naturally yield an
answer, in many cases the dictionary will offer different definitions that vary with the context
of the word usage. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325,
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grammar" in the process of interpretation; a1 and compare wordings-
particularly within statutes of a similar type. ' s Courts will look to
surrounding portions of the statute to make an interpretation of a particular
provision within its context,'2 6 which includes not only wording but also
the structure of the statute.27 As Justice Sutherland poetically expressed,
"a word may be known by the company it keeps."' s Context is a key part
I33 1-33 (2011 ) (discussing the word "file" and whether it can apply to oral statements in ad-
dition to written statements).
124 Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2389.
125 Courts will look beyond one particular act to find other Congressional statutes with
similar provisions. See, e.g., Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1332-33 (interpreting by comparing other stat-
utes containing anti-retaliation provisions); see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P.
FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1039 (3d ed. 2001). Indeed, in some instances courts have looked
to similar statutes rather than looking to the legislative history of the statute at issue. See
Barbara D. Goldberg & Richard J. Monies, Recent Interpretations of the CPLR by New York Appel-
late Courts, 74 ALB. L. REV. 745, 765 (2OIO-I l) (discussing and applying the "amended saving
statute").
Reference to similar or analogous statutes is particularly common when wording is of-
ten repeated across multiple statutes within a particular field, such as in the Clean Air Act,
which served as a model for a number of subsequent environmental statutes. Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) ("[Wlhen Congress uses the same language in two statutes
having similar purposes ... it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to
have the same meaning in both statutes."). Courts may also look to "contemporaneous judicial
usage" when interpreting a legal term of art. E.g., Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1332 (2011) (considering
such usage to determine that the word "file" encompasses oral filings).
126 See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004) ("[W~e construe language in its con-
text and in light of the terms surrounding it.") (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223,
229 (1993)).
127 See, e.g., Tristani ex rel. v. Richman, 652 E3d 360, 375 (3d Cir. 2o 1I) (interpreting the
Social Security Act in light of its structure).
128 Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514,519 (1923). While this case is of-
ten cited on this particular proposition, (see, for example, Samantar v. Yousuf, I30 S. Ct. 2278,
2287-88 (2010)), it is important to note that the Court immediately qualified the rule, stating
that the contextual approach is "not an invariable rule" and that a "word may have a character
of its own not to be submerged by its association." Russell, 261 U.S. at 519.
Context remains, however, a significant part of the process of interpreting a statutory
term. The Court's view of context extends to adjacent definitions. See McNeill v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (2011) (comparing "adjacent definition of 'violent felony' in in-
terpreting "serious drug offense") (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
The Court also draws relevant conclusions from statutory silences. See Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at
2390 (describing the "[equally illuminating ... statutory silence")). If "Congress uses similar
statutory language ... in two adjoining provisions, it normally intends similar interpretations."
Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 230i (2009) (citing IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34
(2005)); see Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1972) (noting that similar inter-
pretations are preferred unless something in the legislative history would suggest that Con-
gress intended material differences between the two instances). Where one possible interpre-
tation "gives effect 'to every clause and word of a statute,"' the "canon against superfluity"
applies to assist in avoiding excess language. Microsoft Corp. v. i4 i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238,
2248 (2011 ) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2ooi)). Additionally, the statutory
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of the process of statutory interpretation and the outcome "often turns on
context." 129 Context may illuminate the "congressional purposes explicit in
the statutory text."
130
B. Referential Canons
Unfortunately, context often fails to resolve ambiguities. When this is
the case, Justices diverge in their opinions as to whether courts may look
beyond the text and structure of the statute itself to seek out additional
information regarding congressional intent.13
Purposive methods seek an overarching goal or force behind a piece of
legislation to serve as a touchstone. Followers cite "the real risks of Rule
interpretation when courts rely on text unaided by the touchstones of
history and purpose," which may not be obvious within the text itself.'32
Their point may be supported, for example, by a recent community debate
in Evanston, Indiana. An ordinance in the city bans more than three
unrelated persons from living together and has recently been used to target
Northwestern students who, at times, make less than ideal neighbors for
suburbanites-a use likely beyond the scope of the ordinance's original
context is utilized during the process of interpretation to ensure that the adopted interpreta-
tion does not "rende[r] the statutory scheme '[inicoherent and [in]consistent."' Chamber of
Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 2002 (zoi i) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting
Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 222 (2008)).
129 FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1182 (2o1).
130 See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1632-
33 (2oo) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (examining the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and
the statutes within to argue that the majority's holding frustrates an explicit congressional
purpose).
131 Ambiguity is, of course, frequently alleged-perhaps often creatively-by parties
with competing interests. The role of parties' competing definitions in determining ambiguity
was raised in Sossamon v. Texas. See Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1659-6o (2011) (discuss-
ing two plausible interpretations of "appropriate relief" and holding that the phrase could not
be subject to ambiguity when one possible interpretation contained a waiver of sovereign
immunity). The majority opinion noted that the parties' plausible and contradictory inter-
pretations indicated that the statute was ambiguous. Id. at 166o. Justice Sotomayor strongly
disagreed in her dissent, arguing that such an approach would render "our capacity to interpret
authoritatively the text of a federal statute ... held hostage to the litigants' strategic argu-
ments." Id. at 1668 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). She concludes that "[i]f this were true, there
would be few cases in which we would be able to decide that a statute was unambiguous."
Id. Justice Sotomayor's concern echoes previous decisions, which have noted that where the
parties agree on an interpretation of an ambiguous term, the court "will not flout all usual rules
of statutory interpretation to take the side of the bare majority." Milner v. Dep't of Navy, 131
S. Ct. 1259, 1269 (201i). See also In re Visteon Corp., 612 F3d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 2oo) (stating
that the general rule regarding ambiguity is when a text is ambiguous where it is "reasonably
susceptible of different interpretations").
132 Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Reassessing the Avoidance Canon in Erie Cases, 44 AKRON L.
REV. IO67, 1 IO8 (2011).
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purpose.'33 While the students fall within the bounds of the ordinance text,
some would argue that the creative re-use of this law is unjust-or, more
specifically, lacks the requisite democratic support. To avoid such potential
pitfalls and to ascertain congressional intent, intentionalists and modern
textualists'34 search beyond the enacted text by looking to the legislative
history3 ' or even further to other historical sources and trends. 3 6
Textualists would cite a different democratic conundrum: "the
possibility that legislation does not pursue its goal at all costs .... [and] only
the text that passed through the legislative process can possess the force of
law."'37 As the Court itself has explained, "Application of 'broad purposes'
of legislation at the expense of specific provisions ignores the complexity
of the problems Congress is called upon to address and the dynamics of
legislative action."' 38 Even if Congress's intent is unanimous, legislators
may have dramatically different concepts of the means to effectuate that
intent; therefore, "the final language of the legislation may reflect hard-
fought compromises."'39 Others, Justice Scalia in particular, would cite
the risk that "judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires,
extending their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the
statutory field."'4° This conflict has resulted in a number of Supreme Court
cases where separate opinions argue the appropriateness of consulting
legislative history. '
133 Reportedly, the purpose of the ordinance was not to police living accommodations,
but to target brothels. See Alex Kane Rudansky, In Focus: Evanston WillEnforce "BrothelRule"
Starting in July, NU Administration Won't Fight It, DAILY NORTHWESTERN, Jan. 24, 201 i, available
at http://dailynorthwestern.com/2o I I/o I/24/city/in-focus-evanston-will-enforce-brothel-rule-
starting-in-july-nu-administration-wont-fight-it/.
134 ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 234-36 (comparing approaches of intentionalists and new
textualists).
We are rich in scholarship-and opinions-on the appropriate method of textual inter-
pretation. Perhaps surprisingly given the scholarly and judicial angst, our methods are quite
similar to ones used historically across cultures. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Max-
ims of Interpretation, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1 179, 1183-91 (1990).
135 See, e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379,397 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting his
"examination of the provision's legislative history").
136 See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 590-91 (2004) (using
a "social history" in combination with the legislative history to interpret a federal statute).
137 Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 H~av. L. REV. 542, 552-53 (2009).
138 Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361,373-74
(1986).
139 Id. at 374-
14o Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, 17-18
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
Arguably a similar issue arises when the courts try to use legislative history to avoid their
own doctrine of agency deference. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 566 U.S. 2o8,
2 17-20 (2009) (arguing precisely such a maneuver).
141 E.g., Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 474 U.S. at 373-74 (discussing the problems
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Even if a court is willing to be "informed by the statutory history,"'42
which "may illuminate ambiguous text," ' 143 the primordial text may provide
little guidance."4 As Justice Kennedy has observed, "legislative history
is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory," which may serve
as an invitation to interpreting courts to "loo[k] over a crowd and pic[k]
out your friends."' 14 Additionally, relying on legislative history may "give
unrepresentative committee members-or, worse yet, unelected staffers
and lobbyists-both the power and the incentive to attempt strategic
manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable
to achieve through the statutory text."'146 Therefore, it is important to
consider both the purpose and context, which will yield a single reasonable
interpretation for a provision that might otherwise, when "considered in
isolation,... be open to competing interpretations."
147
These varied approaches to the legislative history must, however, be
held within their proper context. Despite their methodological differences,
Justices privilege the text and only reluctantly resort to legislative history.
As a result, the linguistic and substantive canons carry greater significance
because they may be partnered with the text alone, without recourse to the
legislative history.
C. Substantive Canons
Karl Llewellyn, who has been widely regarded for his early taxonomy
of statutory interpretation, described the substantive canons as unique
from the other categories because these canons departed from value-
neutral methods and were justified based on their reliance on foundational
principles found in the constitutional structure or the common law.'48 While
incurred in divining congressional intent from statutes).
142 CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, I31 S. Ct. 2630, 2633 (201 1).
143 Milner v. Dep't of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259,1266 (201 1).
I44 See, e.g., Debra Carfora, United States v. Newmark: Semantics and Misrepresentation
in Mail and Wire Fraud, Does It Really Matter Who Was Deceived?, 6o CATH. U. L. REV. 779, 80o
(201i).
145 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (citing Patricia
M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68
IowA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983)).
146 Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 568. Justice Kennedy continues, noting that "[wie
need not comment here on whether these problems are sufficiently prevalent to render leg-
islative history inherently unreliable in all circumstances, a point on which Members of this
Court have disagreed." Id. at 568-69.
147 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331 (zol I).
148 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950). Notably, the Supreme Court
recently affirmed the role of the common law in statutory interpretation. See United States v.
Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2325 (201i) (citing United States v. White Mountain
Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003)).
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Llewellyn critiqued the substantive canons as determinative policy choices
of the Court that would be reflected in case decisions, Eskridge and Frickey
later argued that the substantive canons were not causally related to the
Court's decisions, but rather "reflect[] an underlying 'ideology,' or mix of
values and strategies that the Court brings to statutory interpretation. 149 In
either formulation, substantive rules stand out among the methodological
choices for their significance in either persuading the Court or in reflecting
the Court's commitment to certain fundamental notions of republican
government, including the canon of legislating for the common good and
for the federalist structure.
With respect to the federalist structure, recently the Court has favored
grounding all statutory interpretations in fundamental constitutional
concepts unless Congress has specifically directed the Court to otherwise
in the text of the statute. The newly developed "clear statement rule"
exemplifies this approach; this rule institutes a scalar decision about power
where constitutional principles reign supreme unless expressly rebutted
in the statutory text. 5' These rules appear to be particularly designed
to protect "structures associated with federalism.""'' On the one hand,
there are advantages to this approach. As Eskridge and Frickey explain,
"structural constitutional protections, especially those of federalism, are
underenforced constitutional norms."5 I On the other hand, while perhaps
the majority of scholars would say that federalism must reach beyond
the mere representation of the states in Congress,'53 this approach could
be seen as judicial activism by another name because the Court could
potentially bolster tenuously accepted constitutional concepts as law
through the guise of a statutory interpretation case. 15 4 For our purposes
here, the merits of clear statement rules may be set aside. Our primary
concern is that the Court's recent adoption of this approach generally and
the clear statement rule specifically reflects a willingness to look to the
basic constitutional structures, particularly federalism, to fill in gaps or
reinforce arguments within the process of statutory interpretation. Such
willingness may influence the Court as it engages the canon of the common
149 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VANID. L. REv. 593, 596 (1992).
150 See id. at 597 (describing the clear statement rules as a new form of Court activism
that allows the Court to protect constitutional structures through the use of presumptions that
must be rebutted by Congress in the text).
151 Id.
152 Id.
I53 See Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. RE\v 1349, 1357
(2001) ("Modern 'political safeguards' theorists have ... focused on the representation of
the states in Congress as the critical, even exclusive, constitutional protection for federalism.
Many judges and scholars have been properly skeptical of these claims.").
154 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 149, at 598.
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good, particularly when benefits are generated at both regional and national
scales.
D. The Canon of the Common Good
The canon of the common or public good stands on a lengthy legal
history, and its significance is frequently affirmed. Madison's version of
classical republican thought tied the political process to deliberation about
the nature of the public good.' Within English law the monarch held a
unique prerogative or executive power-that of "acting for the public good,
where the positive laws are silent."'5 6 As Justice Stone wrote in 1937, our
"most fundamental principle of government" is that it is created "primarily
to provide for the common good."'5 7 As Justice Brennan explained, "[G]
overnment regulation-by definition-involves the adjustment of rights
for the public good."'5 8 The state "has no other excuse for being."'59
By virtue of this principle, the job of the legislature is to "by
reasonable enactment" determine "what the health, morals and safety of
the public require for the common good." 16° As Justice Brennan explained,
legislators' sphere of legitimate activity is "formulating and expressing their
vision of the public good within self-defined constitutional boundaries."161
Those constitutional boundaries are themselves created by an "overriding
definition of the 'public good,' and a court's valid command to obey
constitutional dictates is not subject to override by any countervailing
preferences of the polity, no matter how widely and ardently shared."' 62
The court must endeavor to "select an interpretation that best promotes or
155 See THE FEDERALIST No. Io, at 43 (James Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003) ("If a
faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which
enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote: It may clog the administration,
it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the
forms of the Constitution.").
I56 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 234 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
157 Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 523 0937). There is, however, a
certain irony in that some courts have used the common good as a test for determining a gov-
ernmental function, which, therefore, creates a circular definition. See, eg., Daugherty v. State
Dep't of Natural Res., 283 N.W.2d 825, 827 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). A similar circularity often
is found in the definitions of public policy and the common good. See, e.g., Dille v. St. Luke's
Hosp., 196 S.W.2d 615, 619-20 (Mo. 1946).
158 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
159 Fordyce & McKee v. Woman's Christian Nat'l Library Ass'n, 96 S.W. 155, 159 (Ark.
19o6).
16o City of Fayetteville v. S & H, Inc., 547 S.W.2d 94, IOO (Ark. 1977) (Fogleman, J.,
dissenting).
I61 Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 300 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 3oi.
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least harms the public good," 163 or to "govern [its] actions (interpreting law)
in accordance with the common good of all mankind."" 6
One limit to the courts' powers of statutory interpretation with
respect to the common good arises from a conflict between the powers
of the court and the delegated powers of statutory interpretation given to
an administrative agency. Courts are not able to supersede the agency's
judgment based on their own idea of some "vague, undefined public
good."'65 This qualification of courts' powers of interpretation does not at
all detract from the significance of the common good imperative: deference
to the administrative agency is grounded on the agency being "in the best
position to determine what is and what is not in the public good."'166
With such a long history, there has been both too much and too little
judicial and scholarly engagement with the concept of the common good.
On the one hand, there is an ongoing litany of public debate about the best
interests of the people that rises and falls, cresting every four years with
tidal regularity. On the other hand, within judicial decision-making there
has been a tendency to gloss over the common good as obvious even while
treating it as a part of a deeply significant substantive canon. In part, this
may result from the fact that even the most aggressive political contenders
tend to agree that certain services must be provided as part of the common
good, including public schools, 167 public hospitals, 168 playgrounds, 16 public
163 Richard J. Scislowski, The U.C.C. Section 4-205(2) Payment/Deposit Warranty: Allow a
Drawer to Hold a Depository Bank Liable for Collecting an Item with a Forged Indorsement, 28 AK-
RON L. REV. 573, 605 (1995).
164 United States v. Shannon, I 1o F3 d 382,413 (7th Cir. 1997).
165 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549
(1977); see also Vial v. First Commerce Corp., 564 F Supp. 650, 667 (E.D. La. 1983).
166 State Health Planning & Dev. Agency v. AMI Brookwood Med. Ctr., 564 So. 2d 63,
73 (Ala. 199o) (Maddox, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Courts are not, of course,
necessarily confident of the agencies' superior ability to locate and define common public
goods. This hesitance on the part of the courts appears in decisions that acknowledge agency
deference and yet note that the agency is "supposedly" in a better position to determine the
common good. See, e.g., id.
167 See, e.g., Wartsila NSD N. Am., Inc. v. Hill Int'l, Inc., 530 F3d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 2oo8);
Rural Special Sch. Dist. No. 21 v. Common Sch. Dist. No. 87,35 S.Wad 587, 588 (Ark. 1931);
Davis v. Moon, 289 P.2d 614, 618 (Idaho 1955). Many courts also expand this understanding of
public goods to incorporate a host of related activities, such as supporting high school sports.
See, e.g., Cotto v. Bd. of Educ., 2006 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1966, at *to (Conn. Super. Ct. June
30, 2oo6); see also Citizens Coal. v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 619 A.2d 940, 952 (D.C.
1993) (regarding generating power for a university).
168 Parker v. City of Highland Park, 273 N.W.2d 413,421 (Mich. 1978) (Ryan, J., dissent-
ing); see also Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 718 P.2d 478, 481 (Ariz. 1986); Citizens Coal., 619
A.2d at 952.
169 See, e.g., Pichette v. Manistique Pub. Schs., 269 N.W.ad 143, 151 (Mich. 1978) (citing
Gunther v. Cheboygan Cnty. Road Cmm'rs, 196 N.W. 386 (Mich. 1923)).
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works, 70 emergency services,' law enforcement,' public utilities,'73 and
public transportation. 7 4 Ironically, while some cases treat the common good
as obvious, others suggest the question is inherently political and beyond
the scope of the judiciary. The Tenth Circuit recently suggested that
"[als a creature of politics, the definition of the public good changes with
the political winds."'7 5 The Louisiana Supreme Court has taken a more
drastic view, opining that the common good is "in every case a question of
public policy" and "[t]he meaning of the term is flexible."' 17 6
This is not to say that the common good lacks substantive content. Like
other substantive rules in Eskridge and Frickey's formulation, common
good may reflect a "mix of values and strategies that the Court brings
to statutory interpretation."'77 Cases invoking the public good as a sort
of trump card also indicate substantive content. For example, when the
Court considered an issue of privileges in Jaffee v. Redmond, Justice Stevens
explained that even though testimonial privileges are disfavored, there are
moments when a "public good [may transcend] the normally predominant
principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth."'78 Similarly,
elected officials are provided certain unusual immunities because these
are understood to be necessary to ensure the public good of effective
democratic representation.'79 As a result of such decisions, the common
good has accumulated substantive content over the years. Some common
goods, such as the physical and mental health of our citizens, have been
identified as transcendent, superseding other admittedly admirable ends."'
Justice Breyer cited a similar superseding common good in Rubin v. United
States, explaining that "the President's physical safety amounts to the kind
of transcendent public good that, in principle, might justify the recognition
of a new privilege.""'
170 See, e.g., Wiles v. Bagley, 561 F3d 636, 643 (6th Cir. 2009) (Martin, J., concurring).
171 See, e.g., id.
172 See, e.g., id.
173 See, e.g., Wartsila NSD N. Am., Inc. v. Hill Int'l, Inc., 530 E3 d 269, 275 (3d Cit. 2oo8);
Williams v. United States, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22818, at *1o (W.D.N.C. Sept. 9, 1999).
174 See, e.g., Wiles, 561 E3 d at 643 (Martin, J., concurring).
175 Powers v. Harris, 379 E3d 12o8, i218 (1oth Cir. 2004).
176 ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 35 So. 3d 192, 198 (La. 2olo) (quot-
ing City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Land Co., 136 So. 91, 92-93 (La. 193 i)).
177 Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 149, at 596.
178 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. I, 9 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 5° (198o)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179 Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 52 (1998).
i8o SeeJaffee, 518 U.S. at i i ("The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical
health, is a public good of transcendent importance.").
181 Rubin v. United States, 525 U.S. 990,991 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing In re:
Sealed Case, 148 E3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 19 9 8)).
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The common good is, historically, something held distinct from the idea
of simply aggregating "competing private interests.""18 Determining the
public good in any particular circumstance "entails not merely economic
and mathematical analysis but value judgment." 183 Therefore, legislation "is
not universally considered contrary to the public good if the net economic
loss to the losers exceeds the net economic gain to the winners."1" As a
result, when agencies are charged with determining the public good in a
particular context, their governing statutes often fail to "prescribe a precise
formula" for such determinations. 185
The power of eminent domain illustrates how the pursuit of the
common good can in fact operate detrimentally to private interests. 18 6
Eminent domain powers are often used to "provide quintessentially public
goods, such as public roads, toll roads, ferries, canals, railroads, and public
parks."'' However, the elimination of a private interest does not invalidate
the state's use of eminent domain to generate common goods; ss such
situations are justified because the private benefit is incidental to a more
significant purpose of creating the public good.1"9
The common good imperative also shapes statutory interpretation in
another significant way. Where a statute is recognized to be "remedial in
nature and designed to promote the public good," courts will allow more
leeway and "interpret[] [the statute] broadly to effectuate its purpose."'19
When the statute makes explicit reference to the common good, the
182 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REV.
22, 68 (1992).
183 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365,377 (199).
184 Id.
185 E.g., Appeal of Conservation Law Found., Inc., 507 A.2d 652,684 (N.H. 1986).
186 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). In defining a taking, the
majority explained that compensation is required "when the owner of real property has been
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good." Id.
187 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,512 (2005).
188 See id. at 485 n.14. Kelo is perhaps best known for this proposition, but the majority
noted a number of precedents in the way of private benefits resulting from the use of eminent
domain powers, including a transfer of rail track between private companies and the provi-
sion of legal services to the poor. Id. (citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp.,
503 U.S. 407 (1992). See also Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003). Haw. Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 22 9 (1984)).
189 Patents and copyrights, for example, are justified because of their ability to "pro-
mote the progress of science." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 187 (2003) (discussing the
statutory justification for the Copyright and Patent Clause, U.S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8). The
Copyright and Patent Clause further exists to "stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good." Id. at 245 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975)). The Court explains that the copyright is a reward, but such a reward "is a means, not
an end," and therefore the copyright is limited rather than perpetual in duration. Id. at 245-46.
19o Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 32 F3d 528, 534
(r1th Cir. 1994).
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court may not apply a "strict [or] narrow interpretation,"' 9' but rather
must interpret the statute "liberally."' 92 This is a principle of statutory
interpretation that has dated to the earliest years of our republic. 19 3
In the end, however, while there is ample evidence of substantive
meaning within the common good canon, the argument in the following
section suggests that the canon takes on a new significance when scale
enters the discussion.
III. AMBIGUITY OF SCALE & STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Defining & Theorizing Scale
Like place, space, and landscape, scale is a central theoretical concept in
the discipline of geography. 1"4 While place and space were well developed
as concepts, scale lagged behind in the theorization of geography.195
However, modern developments such as web-based commerce and low cost
telecommunications solutions such as Skype have encouraged theorists to
redirect their attention to the nature of scale. 196
Thinking specifically about scale has generated opportunities for
critiquing the ontological nature of scale-for thinking about whether units
191 City and Cnty. of Denver v. Stenger, 295 F. 809, 816 (8th Cir. 1924). This approach to
statutory interpretation is also a parallel to the requirement that remedial statutes are inter-
preted broadly. See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. N.Y State Div. of Hous. and Cmty.
Renewal, 854 E Supp. 151, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Indeed, in some decisions courts combine
the two approaches, noting that remedial statutes must be interpreted for the common or
public good. See, e.g., Mortenson v. Leatherwood Constr., Inc., 137 S.W.3d 529, 536 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2004).
192 First Iowa State Bank v. Iowa Dep't. Natural Res., 5o2 N.W.2d 164, 166 (Iowa 1993).
193 See, e.g., United States v. State Bank of N.C., 31 U.S. 29,35 (832).
194 Andrew Herod, Scale: The Local and the Global, in KEY CONCEPTS IN GEOGRAPHY 229
(Sarah L. Holloway et. al. eds., 2003) (explaining that scale was initially overlooked by geogra-
phers, but later became a central point of theorizing within the discipline).
195 See id. at 230 (stating that various reseach projects looked at issues from both a na-
tional and regional scale, yet neglecting to theorize "on the nature of scale itself"). To some
degree, problems of scale were simply relegated to discrete theoretical questions in geography
as opposed to more general philosophical debates in the field. For example, scale is, of course,
an important concept to consider in the history of cartography, which has long recognized how
variables such as scale may pretend a level of scientific neutrality but, in fact, harbor signifi-
cant persuasive power. See J. Brian Harley, Maps, Knowledge, and Power, in THE ICONOGRAPHY
OF LANDSCAPE: ESSAYS ON THE SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION, DESIGN AND USE OF PAST ENVIRON-
MENTS 292 (Denis Cosgrove & Stephen Daniels eds., 1988).
196 See Herod, supra note 194, at 229. These modern developments underline the schol-
arship that has long worked to establish the "fundamentally interconnected" nature of scales.
Linda McDowell, Spatializing Feminism: Geographic Perspectives, in BODYSPACE: DESTABILIZING
GEOGRAPHIES OF GENDER AND SEXUALITY 28, 31 (Nancy Duncan ed., 1996); see Doreen Massey,
Politics and Space!Time, in PLACE AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 141, 155 (Michael Keith &
Steve Pile eds., 1993).
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such as the local, the state, the national, and the global are predetermined or
"material social products."'97 More to the point, thinking specifically about
scale has encouraged questioning of the idea of a natural hierarchy in the
local, national, and global'98 and has encouraged recognition of the degree
to which political and social struggles occur across a variety of scales. "I The
hierarchical history of the concept of scale is indeed so strong that some
theorists have argued against the category of scale on the grounds that it
too easily reifies the hierarchy; scholars are much in agreement that scale
is a material social product and, therefore, deeply culturally contingent
and colored by existing power structures. 00 The hierarchy of scale is one
that too easily passes unnoticed; scale provides a definitive quantitative
distinction, however, because scale is viewed as a materially social
product this quantitative distinction is, unfortunately, often mistaken for a
qualitative determination. 0 ' The danger of scale, therefore, is the degree
to which it is treated as a neutral and predetermined backdrop rather than
a variable, shifting and relevant in the process of governance.
Most importantly for purposes of this article, scale crystalizes a central
problem at the intersection of law and geography: the tendency in our
society to treat our federalist system as the simple answer to all questions
of law and geography, cutting off the need for either inquiry or debate.0 2
197 Herod, supra note 194, at 230. This approach to scale has complemented work on
the nature of boundaries, their creation and maintenance, and the existence of communities
that span boundary lines, resulting in porousness rather than rigidity. See, e.g., Joel S. Migdal,
Mental Maps and Virtual Checkpoints, in BOUNDARIES AND BELONGING: STATES AND SOCIETIES IN
THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE IDENTITIES AND LOCAL PRACTICES 3, 5-14 (Joel S. Migdal ed., 2004).
198 See Nicholas Blomley, Landscapes of Property, 32 LAW & Soc'y REV. 567, 569 (1998)
(stating that experiences, rather than "determinable segments of the physical world" also con-
tribute to the idea of scale) (citatation omitted).
199 See David Harvey, Notes Towards a Theory of Uneven Geographical Development, in
SPACES OF NEOLIBERALIZATION: TOWARDS A THEORY OF UNEVEN GEOGRAPHICAL DEVELOPMENT,
HETTNER-LECTURE 2004 55, 58 (Hans Gebhardt et al. eds. 2005) (proposing a general theory
of uneven geographical development within capitalism based, in part, on "political, social and
'class' struggles at a variety of geographical scales").
2oo See Sallie A. Marston, et al., Human Geography Without Scale, 30 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
INST. OF BRITISH GEOGRAPHERS 416 (2005) (arguing that scale is a dangerous category even
when acknowledged as socially constructed due to the naturalization or reification of hierar-
chical power relations).
2o See David Laven & Timothy Baycroft, Border Regions and Identiy, 15 EUR. REV. HIST.
255, 256 (zoo8) ("[Slimply by applying the epithet 'national' or 'regional' or 'local,' we appear
to be making a qualitative or hierarchical distinction between what are fundamentally the
same sort of identities .... ").
202 See Lisa R. Pruitt, Gender Geography &Rural Justice, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST.
338,383 (2OO8) ("When geography meets law, scale often equates with jurisdiction, which is a
proxy for where the power of decision-making resides, or the level of governmental interests
that are implicated.") (footnote omitted).
Notably, the concept of the public good is used to readily affirm the static nature of
the relationship between the states and the federal government in our system. See Perez v.
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Courts have long recognized that our federal system generates public goods
at a number of different scales. While the federal government primarily
operates at the national scale, our local and state governments work to
"provide public goods and services on their own" because they too are
charged with "the responsibility of protecting the health, safety, and welfare
of [their] citizens." 03 With this approach, theoretical examinations of scale
were left unexamined in favor of solving quandaries about efficiencies,
transaction costs, and externalities in choosing the appropriate scale from
which to deliver public services.2"
Often, attention focuses on the problem of alignment (or mismatches)
in the scale of government when compared to the geographical reach of
a particular public good."0 5 For example, Robert C. Ellickson suggests a
device known as the Block Improvement District in order to facilitate the
improvement of neighborhoods through the repair of broken windows,
something Ellickson describes as a "block-level public good." ' 6 While
recognizing that "some local public goods, such as a mosquito abatement
program, a sewage treatment facility, or a tourism office, can benefit an
entire metropolitan area," Ellickson distinguishes these from the category
of public goods that "typically benefit only a few blocks." ' 7 While Ellickson
notes that formal governance structures are not necessary and often
property owners can succeed in providing these goods themselves through
social norms, he recognizes that without a significant amount of social
cohesion within a group, structures that are both formal and coercive may be
required. 08 The question then becomes the appropriate scale for creating
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 129 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203 Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 340 (2008) (citing United Haulers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,343 (2007) (explaining
that the pursuit of the common good at the state and local levels justifies a certain amount of
"protectionism" which is only limited by constitutional concerns).
204 See Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 8o
(1998) ("An adjustment in territorial size simultaenously affects the efficiency of the scale of
production, the transaction costs of internal governance, and the seriousness of transboundary
spillover effects.") (footnote omitted). In an earlier article, Ellickson discussed these issues in
more detail, although in that case he directed his attention to the ideal parcel size for land as
opposed to the question of the scale of governance. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102
YALE L.J. i315, 1332 (993). While the issues are, of course, quite distinct, Ellickson's reflec-
tions on the ideal placement of boundary lines for the purposes of obtaining social goods are
relevant to generalizing the types of concerns relevant to questions of the appropriate scale of
governance and the common good.
205 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 76 (997)
(discussing who is best positioned to structure programs that provide a social good-individu-
als or the government); James J. Kelly, Land Trusts that Conserve Communities, 59 DEPAUL L.
REV. 69, 105 (2009) (stating that laws should be "recast" to maximize the common good).
2o6 Ellickson, supra note 204, at 75, 78-79.
207 Id. at 78.
2o8 Id. at 79.
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the block-level public goods. After considering the block, neighborhood,
and city as possible levels for governance structures, Ellickson relies on
data from new block-level institutions in new developments as well as
theoretical analyses of the advantages of the smallest scale to conclude that
block-level structures are most effective and efficient.20 9
Ellickson's approach reflects both the existence of a deficiency and
an important innovation in our thinking about scales. On the one hand,
the debate about the appropriate scale for the delivery of goods is part
of the problem: it has allowed us to treat scale as a variable rather than a
theoretical concept in need of development. On the other hand, Ellickson's
idea of block-level governance steps beyond the assumption that scale is
constitutionally dictated in the federalist structure. Hopefully Ellickson's
work indicates a trend of examining scale thoughtfully within the context
of determining the common good.
B. Conflicts in Scale & the Common Good Canon
When it comes to the common good, the concept is empty without
scalar application. There is an implied subject or beneficiary that must
be a community of some type. In discussing the public or common good,
H.L.A. Hart described the failure of coherent definitions, a problem that
he specifically attributed to the possibility of ambiguities in scale: "[I1t
is not clear what these phrases [like "public good" and "common good"]
mean, since there seems to be no scale by which contributions of the
various alternatives to the common good can be measured and the greater
identified." ' 0
Consider, for example, a recent Louisiana Supreme Court case involving
the question of the constitutional threshold for "public use." '' After
noting the difficulty of defining the public good, the court noted that one
approach is to authorize eminent domain "to promote such public benefit,
etc., especially where the interests involved are of considerable magnitude,
and it is sought to use the power in order that the natural resources and
advantages of a locality may receive the fullest development in view of the
general welfare" (whose scale is not clarified)."2 The Louisiana Supreme
Court did explain that other courts would decide the matter based on
209 Id. at 79-90.
21o H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 162-63 (1961).
211 ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 35 So. 3d 192, 198 (La. 20 io) (quot-
ing City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Land Co., 136 So. 91, 92-93 (1931)). Regarding the
public good, the court explained "No general definition of what degree of public good will
meet the constitutional requirements for a 'public use can be framed, as it is in every case a
question of public policy. The meaning of the term is flexible and is not confined to what may
constitute a public use at any given time, but in general it may be said to cover a use affecting
the public generally, or any number thereof, as distinguished from particular individuals." Id.
212 Id. (emphasis added).
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"[t]he character of the use, and not its extent," therefore to those courts
"[the fact that] the number of persons who are expected to avail themselves
thereof is small... is immaterial provided it is open to all upon the same
terms." '13 Both the theoretical understanding and practical applications of
scale are outcome determinative for the common good canon.
With the intended scale of the benefit so rarely addressed in any depth,
the more common approach appears to be to emphasize the magnitude
of the impacts for the public. 14 More is better. Larger is better. Ls Indeed,
philosophers have debated whether, morally, a state's common good must
be at the largest possible scale.216 In the same vein, Richard Posner's
pragmatic method of statutory interpretation is centered on the idea that
decisions should be outcome driven-although not consequentialist 2I7-
because the primary purpose should always be the optimization of social
welfare.2 18
With the common good canon viewed as continually pushing for the
larger scale, there is a distinct possibility that courts will allow this canon-
particularly when it is combined with the federalism canon-to manipulate
the interpretation of scaled legislation to optimize national over smaller
scale goods. And, unfortunately, the idea that care should be taken to align
the common good with the appropriate scale seems to be mentioned only
in passing. 19 Case precedents suggest that in the event of an ambiguity in
the meaning of the common good that may be attributable to the lack of
a specifically defined scale, courts will default to the larger expressions of
213 Id.
214 Id. at 198-99.
215 One concern is that a smaller scale may facilitate a tyranny of the majority at the
lower levels of government. One court points to James Madison's warning that "majorities in
small communities can define the common good in a way that 'will invade the rights of other
citizens."' Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 813 E2d 922,
932 n.17 (9th Cir.1987) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 22 (James Madison) (2d ed. Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press 1966)).
216 See A.S. McGrade, What Aquinas Should Have Said? Finnis's Reconstruction of Social
and Political Thomism, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 125, 133 (I999). On the other hand, deliberation on the
nature of public good is increasingly difficult as the scale of the debate increases. See Robert
A. Dahl, A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen Participation, 109 POL. ScL. Q.
23, 30 (1994) ("Thus even if transnational democratic institutions are created, they cannot
overcome the limitations imposed by scale and time."). These issues have encouraged some
scholars to suggest that small-scale governance is necessary because a "coherent common
good" cannot be established at a larger scale. See Kelly, supra note 2o5, at 105-06.
217 See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 59-60 (2003) (explicitly
defending against the idea that the theory is consequentialist).
218 See Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to OfferLaw?, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1653,
1664 (1990) (defining the theory in terms of the optimum possible outcomes).
219 See, e.g., Bobby L. Dexter, Rethinking "Insurance," Especially After AIG, 87 DENV. U. L.
REV. 59, 95 (2009) (mentioning briefly the idea that common good can be measured on either
a "national or individual community scale.").
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scale: those of the nation and mankind more generally. As Judge Coffey of
the Seventh Circuit explained in United States v. Shannon, the obligation of
the court is to interpret the law consistent with "the common good of all
mankind."2 0
Repeatedly, courts have held that statutes must be interpreted "so
as to accomplish the greatest public good.""'' In litigation, parties justify
their arguments by claiming that their choices are "most compatible with
the greatest public good." ' This default to the largest possible impact
also leads to a default to the largest practical scale in the vast majority of
cases. Similarly, state courts apply legislation to their own largest scale; for
example, within Vermont, the public good has been defined as "that which
shall be for the greatest benefit of the people of the State of Vermont." ' 3
In the case of scaled legislation, there are likely two tiers of benefits-
one directed to the local area and another directed to a larger, likely
national, scale. Explicit prioritization of these is unlikely-both because
of the practicalities of coalition building and because the two tiers of
benefits may be seen as somewhat overlapping or coordinating. In such
circumstances, when legislation is challenged, the common good canon is
likely to combine with the preference for a federalist structure, generating
an interpretation that optimizes benefits to the national scale. Indeed, in the
worst-case scenario, the smaller scale may even accept certain detriments
in furtherance of the national good that was set out in the statute.
Unlike true constitutional holdings of the Court, these statutory
interpretation decisions can be overturned through the ordinary
congressional process. Although this is much less burdensome for
Congress than the constitutional amendment process necessary in other
circumstances, such outcomes would impact locations that may have
limited resources for lobbying efforts-and may have expended the bulk
of them on previous efforts. More importantly, congressional intent may
be repeatedly skewed because the benefits and detriments are assigned
unequally based on the geography and population of an area. As a result,
those who suffer due to the misinterpretation of the intended beneficiary
of the public good-limited populations in specific, often rural areas-are
those most unlikely to voice their challenges.
220 United States v. Shannon, I io E3 d 382, 413 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Coffey, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part).
221 Missouri ex rel. Griffin v. R.L. Persons Constr., Inc., 193 S.W.3 d 424,428 (Mo. Ct. App.
2oo6) (quoting Long v. Interstate Ready-Mix, L.L.C., 83 S.W 3 d 571,574 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)).
222 See, e.g., Watson v. Los Altos Sch. Dist., 308 P.2d 872, 874 n.2 (1957).
223 In re Bellows Falls Hydro-Elec. Corp., 49 A.2d 561, 561 (Vt. 1946).
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IV. AMBIGUITIES OF SCALE IN THE COMMON GOOD, OR A CAUTIONARY TALE
OF THE TVA's LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Within this final section, this article explores the consequences
associated with wrongfully interpreting ambiguously worded scaled
legislation, which necessarily involves the common good, by examining a
micro-history of the legislative process leading up to the creation of the
Tennessee Valley Authority. Scholarly analysis of the TVA has focused on
the agency's operations;2 4 very little has been said about the legislative
history-a notable gap in light of the previously discussed historical fact
that Congress legislated primarily for national goods prior to the 1960s.
This account sheds light on the important legislative history of the
TVA and reveals how support was garnered for such an unusual piece
of geographically specific legislation. This history supplies the necessary
baseline for an additional argument that a scalar ambiguity on the point of
the common good positioned the TVA for an extraordinary transformation.
Critical ambiguities in the TVA's mission stemmed from a conflict
between the visions of Senator Norris and President Roosevelt, the two
primary proponents of the TVA, who applied two very different scales for
determining the "common good." With focus on the crises at hand, the
ambiguities of scale went unnoticed by the two men and their supporters,
resulting in an ambiguous text. As a result, the TVA was highly vulnerable
both to the individual visions of its early leaders and also to the prevailing
political winds.
Before proceeding to explain how the common good ambiguity
crippled the TVA, at least as compared to what Roosevelt had imagined,
it is important to note that this issue should not be subsumed into the
heading of regulatory capture. Regulatory capture refers to agencies
"ceasing to serve the wider collective public interest," generally due to the
agencies' being hijacked by special interests.2 5 The TVA history displays
something far less obvious, and indeed, far more slippery for not being
so pernicious. While the TVA did not cease to serve the public good, it
has switched from understanding the public as a regional designation to
a national designation, thereby allowing the agency to pursue national
goods to the detriment of the local area. In terms of the visibility of the
problem, to the national public, the agency appears not only benign, but
also beneficial, despite the localized and less visible fallout.
224 See, e.g.,WALTER L. CREESE, TVA's PUBLIC PLANNING:THE VISION, THE REALITY (1990);
ROBERT F. DURANT, WHEN GOVERNMENT REGULATES ITSELF: EPA, TVA AND POLLUTION CON-
TROL IN THE 1970S (1985); PHILIP SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASs ROOTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCI-
OLOGY OF FORMAL ORGANIZATION (1966).
225 Mark N. Wexler, Which Fox in What Henhouse and When? Conjectures on Regulatory Cap-
ture, 116 Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 277, 278 (2011) (citation omitted).
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A. In the Beginning. Senator Norris's Vision
Senator George W. Norris, largely regarded as the TVA's greatest
supporter, became passionate about the TVA not because of the Valley itself,
but because of one specific resource in it: Muscle Shoals, a natural river
formation ideal for the generation of massive quantities of hydroelectric
power. This power had been purchased by the government during World
War I for the purposes of generating hydroelectric power for a nitrate plant
that failed to reach completion before the end of the war."2 6
Ownership by the national public was at the heart of Norris's plans.
Norris explained, "It has seemed always to me that the development and
conservation of such resources ought to be under public control, public
operation, and public ownership." ' 7 Norris believed he could bring the
benefits of Muscle Shoals and hydroelectric power to the people, keeping
the profits out of the hands of big business. Just as importantly, the network
of dams could be used systematically for flood control, irrigation, and
navigation."' 8
Senator Norris was specifically interested in "a further transition in the
role of government. Replacing private enterprise in particular sectors of the
economy, the government would engage in broad planning with a set of
objectives that did not regard pecuniary concerns as primary." ' 9 After the
passage of the TVA Act, Norris bravely proclaimed the dawn of a "'New
Civilization' in which human rights would take precedence over property
rights, in which the weak would be protected against the oppression of the
powerful." 3° Norris declared, "[Tihe right to acquire property and make
unlimited profits is not a sacred right." '' Norris went on to invoke the
threat that private enterprise poses to democracy: "All along the pathway
of history there stand the tombstones of dead governments because the
people failed to preserve the rights of man as against the rights of property,
and to protect the weak against the oppression of the powerful." 32 Norris
believed that he had saved a public resource from private greed, reserving
it to the benefit of the nation as a whole. 3 3 Norris secretly held out hope
that the TVA "would serve as a model by which this country could see the
226 See T J. Woofter, Jr., The Tennessee Valley Regional Plan, 12 Soc. FORCES 329 (1934).
227 GEORGE W. NORRIS, FIGHTING LIBERAL: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE W. NORRIS
248-49 (1945). Conservatives, however, wished to use Muscle Shoals for private enterprise.
See id. at 250-51.
228 See id. at 262.
229 RICHARD LowITT, GEORGE W. NORRIS: THE TRIUMPH OF A PROGRESSIVE, 1933-1944
36 (1978).
230 Id. at 47.
231 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
232 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
233 See id. at 16 (emphasizing Norris's "dream for public ownership").
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happiness, material progress, and prosperity to be attained if the American
people act promptly and properly in the preservation of God-given natural
resources of the country."''
B. President Roosevelt & the New Deal:
A National Experiment in Regional Planning
President Roosevelt integrated the development of Muscle Shoals with
his package of economic development and recovery incentives. 3 Others
appeared to share this understanding of the TVA's mission: when Congress
had determined that no bills except those related to "present emergency"
(i.e., the depression) were allowed to the floor for consideration, the
majority leader, Joseph T Robinson, allowed the TVA bill as relating to the
New Deal packages and economic measures.236 When questioned about his
plans for the TVA, Roosevelt explained, "What we are doing there is taking
a watershed with about three and a half million people in it, almost all of
them rural, and we are trying to make a different type of citizen out of them
from what they would be under their present conditions." '37 Roosevelt
acknowledged the struggles of this population, noting, "They have never
had a chance .... So TVA is primarily intended to change and to improve
the standards of living of the people of that valley."'38 Roosevelt didn't
expect national results - he expected results for those 3.5 million residing
within the watershed. The national value, in Roosevelt's mind, was that
the TVA experiment could be replicated across the country if it proved
successful. 39 On December 11, 1934, Roosevelt addressed members of the
National Emergency Council, explaining, "There is a much bigger situation
behind the Tennessee Valley Authority. If you will read the message on
which the legislation was based you will realize that we are conducting a
social experiment .... ,,240 Roosevelt described his experiment as
234 NORRIS, supra note 227, at 249.
235 See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Presidential Address to Congress (Jan. 15, 1940), in 9 TYE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 37, 38 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed.,
1941) (explaining that the TVA was "intended-in part as an experimental project-to raise
the standards of life by increasing social and economic advantages in a given area").
236 Lowi'rr, supra note 229, at 5.
237 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The One Hundred and Sixtieth Press Conference (Excerpts),
Warm Springs, Ga. (Nov. 23, 1934), in 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT, 465, 466 ((Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 194i).
238 Id. at 466-67.
239 Id. (discussing the President's belief that the TVA can be used as an example on a
national scale).
240 MICHAEL J. McDONALD & JOHN MULDOWNY, TVA AND THE DISPOSSESSED 263 (1982)
(footnote omitted).
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[T]he first of its kind in the world, as far as I know, covering a
convenient geographical area-in other words, the watershed of
a great river. The work proceeds along two lines, both of which
are intimately connected-the physical land and water and soil
end of it, and the human side of it.14'
Thus, Roosevelt planned the TVA as "a national experiment in a
regional laboratory,"141 "a dramatic experiment"143 in social planning for
regional development. It has been described as "the most remarkable of
the schemes fostered by the United States overnment to promote economic
recovery."' " The idea was a regional, small-scale test that would have
enormous national implications for the continuing depression. In Chairman
Morgan's words, "[T]he President craves demonstration, justification,
before the general application of a policy. '2 45 Therefore, the Tennessee
Valley was serving as "a laboratory for the Nation."1
46
C. Norris and Roosevelt: The Scale of the Common Good
With the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Senator Norris found a
kindred spirit who was willing to share both his concerns about poverty and
his idea of a river basin as a natural unit for legal intervention. Both Norris
and Roosevelt built their visions around the Valley's natural resources as
public property-resources to be managed for the good of the public rather
than private individuals. 47 With significant opposition to the TVA from both
private utility interests (worried about the government as competition) 48
and Henry Ford (interested in owning the resources privately), 49 Norris
and Roosevelt naturally gravitated toward each other in their mutual ideas
of public ownership. Each leader had his own preoccupation-Norris with
flood control and Roosevelt with poverty relief-but in such measures
their visions were not particularly competitive or contradictory.
241 Id.
242 T J. Woofter, Jr., The Tennessee Basin, 39 AM. J. Soc. 809, 809 (1934).
243 TENN. VALLEY AUTH., TVA TODAY 1975 2 (1975).
244 George B. Barbour, The Tennessee Valley Project, 89 GEOGRAPHICAL J. 393,393 (1937).
245 Arthur E. Morgan, Purposes and Methods of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 172 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 50,51 (934).
246 Id.
247 Seesupra notes 227, 237, and accompanying text.
248 This opposition culminated in Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
Norris describes the opposition of public utilities in detail in his autobiography. See NORRIS,
supra note 227, at 245-5 I.
249 See Jack Neely, Clash of the Titans, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, http://www.tva.gov/
heritage/titans/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) ("Ford wanted to use cheap power from Wilson Dam
to produce nitrate fertilizer. His proposal, which gave rise to hopes among local farmers that
Muscle Shoals would experience the kind of growth Ford had set off in Detroit, spurred ram-
pant land speculation in the Tennessee Valley region.").
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Unfortunately, underneath models that shared similar elements, the
two men held divergent philosophies about the meaning of public property,
particularly in the context of regional development. Roosevelt saw local
natural resources as a way out of poverty for a particularly distressed
population. In his model the imagined community of beneficiaries lived
within the river valley and the surrounding mountain range.5 0 Norris, on
the other hand, was philosophically a utilitarian whose imagined public
beneficiaries were part of a national community. When Norris fought
privatization of natural resources, he sought public ownership on a national
scale.2 '
The TVA thus emanated conceptually from two divergent sets of
priorities. Norris favored flood control, power production, and navigation,
while Roosevelt focused on using the region as an experiment in local
poverty relief."2 These ideas merged to create the TVA's legislative text. s3
The TVA's initial purposes were described as follows:
To improve the navigability and to provide for the flood control
of the Tennessee River; to provide for reforestation and the
proper use of marginal lands in the Tennessee Valley; to provide
for the agricultural and industrial development of said valley; to
provide for the national defense by the creation of a corporation
for the operation of Government properties at and near Muscle
Shoals in the State of Alabama, and for other purposes.M4
Section 1-1 of the Act also specifically empowered the TVA to work
for "the economic and social well-being of the people living in said
river basin."2 '' The scale of the TVA's mission was unclear. The statute
itself referenced the "Tennessee Valley," while a primary purpose was
"reforestation and the proper use of marginal lands in the Tennessee
Valley" and "to provide for the agricultural and industrial development of
said valley."516 Yet, at the same time, the TVA was tasked to "provide for
the national defense" by the "operation of Government properties. 2 7 The
scale of goods being sought was both national and regional-and these two
would meet head to head with the beginning of World War II.
250 See, e.g., supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
251 See, e.g., supra note 227.
252 McDONALD & MULDOWNsupra note 240, at 9-I0.
253 Id. at 12.
254 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, § 1, 48 Stat. 58, 58 (1933) (codified at I6
U.S.C. § 831) (stating the purpose of the act).
255 Id. at § 23, 48 Stat. at 69.
256 Id. at § 1, 48 Stat. at 58.
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D. Shaping of TVA Policy: National Pressures on Regionalism
The TVA's changing policies over the years are to some degree
reflective of changing political and intellectual circumstances as socialism
developed. Initially, the government very much categorized the TVA as
a social experiment and touted the degree to which it relied upon the
developing methodologies of the social sciences. The TVA was generated
in the intellectual context of the rise of social science information as a basis
of social planning. 58
According to Arthur Morgan, the TVA's first Chairman, President
Roosevelt imagined the organization as having been created "in the effort
to bring social and economic design into our national life." '59 As Chairman
Morgan recalled, the President's plan was not so much a loose assortment
of ideas to help the nation as it was a fairly comprehended program of
government and social order, 60 or "an inclusive social philosophy that has
a large degree of clarity, order and integration."161 In light of this, "[t]he
proper way to treat the Tennessee Valley Authority is not as an isolated
undertaking," said the Chairman, but rather "as an integral part of the
whole program of the present administration." 62
The TVA Chairman was also happy to advocate legal changes that
sounded in a social control system of land ownership. Morgan explained
"the laws of land ownership should be changed so that men shall not be
allowed to own and occupy land unless they will manage it in the interest of
a permanent agriculture. Such a legal change would constitute one element
of a social revolution."163 He recognized that "[P]ublic ownership will be
on trial [in this experiment].' ' 64 Chairman Morgan's public addresses and
publications suggest that he understood President Roosevelt's program
to have been influenced by some rather Marxian ideas about class and
class revolution. He described Roosevelt's thinking in one publication in
terms of "treating human society as having a certain degree of unity, of
seeing that we are members of one great family, and that no class can thrive
permanently if it is thriving at the exploitation or at the expense of another
class."1
65
258 See Woofter, supra note 242, at 811 (outlining the TVA plan's application of a more
general social science methodology of governmental planning and citing the need for addi-
tional social science data).
259 Arthur E. Morgan, The Tennessee Valley Authority, 38 THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY 65
(1934)-
26o Id.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 64.
263 Id. at 69.
264 Id.
265 Morgan, supra note 245, at 50.
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T.J. Woofter, writing in 1934, explained that regional planning efforts
of the TVA were distinguished by "newer connotations which the
concept [had] acquired. Its popularity undoubtedly arose first from the
exemplification of national planning by Russia and Italy-planning on a
larger scale than had hitherto been commonly visaged and planning of a
more co-ordinated nature." '66 Early 1930s intellectual and political culture
still supported the United States moving toward social engineering.
By the late 1930s the TVA's language began to change. Rather than
speaking of social planning in the abstract, the TVA grounded its role in
a democracy. The TVA explained that "planning of the Valley's future
must be the democratic labor of many agencies and individuals." '67 The
TVA wanted to distance itself from the idea of a dictatorial leadership
from afar. It declared, "The TVA has no power or desire to impose from
above a comprehensive plan for the social and economic life of the
Valley."2 68
David Lilienthal, Morgan's successor as Chairman, chose another
solution: to drop Morgan's visions of social planning in favor of pure
economic development-power and jobs. Lilienthal concluded that
the "the TVA's chief role is the stimulation and protection of economic
opportunity.2 169 For Lilienthal, economic opportunity might not exactly be
democracy, but it was capitalism and that was close enough.7 0
266 Woofter, supra note 242, at 81o.
267 TENN. VALLEY AUTH., TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY: 1933-1937 2 (Tennessee Valley
Authority ed., U.S. Government Printing Office 1937).
268 Id.
269 TENN. VALLEY AUTH., THE WIDENING OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY THROUGH TVA I
(1940) (adapting an address by Lilienthal at Columbia University for publication). Notably,
Lilenthal went on from the TVA to become the first chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission. STEVEN M. NEUSE, DAVID E. LILIENTHAL: THE JOURNEY OF AN AMERICAN LIBERAL XV
(1997).
270 While Lilienthal is well known for his contribution to the literature on the TVA,
specifically for linking the TVA with grassroots regional democracy in his book TVA: Democracy
on theMarch (1944), the book unfortunately is more a statement of contemporary liberal ideals
than a reflection of TVA practices. While Lilienthal was a champion of people in the region
to the degree that he rejected Morgan's idea of a "mold fashioned from above," Lilienthal
was a master of economics and efficiency, not democracy. Lilienthal understood his work to
be fostering democracy simply because he refused to impose "uplift" plans on the region
and instead simply answered the local call for job creation. When Lilienthal imagined the
mission of the TVA, he did not think in terms of either a grand scheme for regional planning
or for creating mechanisms for actual citizen participation in TVA decision-making. Indeed
Lilienthal's writing shows that he used the term planning quite differently from many of
his contemporaries. For Lilienthal, planning focused quite narrowly on the ability to apply
administrative and technical expertise, which unfortunately was a task that he did assuming
its scientific neutrality and without reference to the will of the people in the region. When
Lilienthal referred to the grassroots of his programs, he did not mean democratic local partici-
pation, but rather decentralized administration-federal plans and statutes adapted to local
conditions by trained administrators. See David E. Lilienthal, The TVA and Decentralization,
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By the 1940s the TVA was working hard to distance itself from
association with social planning as a government activity. In the 1930s,
TVA documents discussed national security work along with social
experimentation and government planning, but by the 1940s, the TVA had
conspicuously changed its tune. Suddenly, the Authority carefully spoke
of its role in a democracy and disputed any suggestion that the regional
Authority was a movement toward government-owned property-an idea
it tried to de-emphasize by speaking frequently of rights of private property
owners and the TVA's contribution to securing those rights. 71 There is a
special tenor to the TVA's propaganda in 1941: a need to defend against the
idea that agency intervention is an imposition on private land rights. The
TVA proclaimed that it "must take into account the implications of our
system of private ownership." 72 The language of TVA reports in this era
dwells on the need to support and grow "private enterprise." '73
A wonderful example of this propagandizing, the TVA Report on
Natural Resources for 1947 contains a section labeled "Mineral Fertilizers
and the Nation's Security" that describes modern farming as "essential
to the future security of the American people."174 The Report goes on to
explain that "[flarmers have a predominant stake in the improvement of
the soil because the soil is their private capital and most basic resource."2
75
The report emphasized the TVA's aid to farmers and touted farmers as "the
greatest private business in America." The TVA also emphasized assistance
with the "farmers-cooperative organization," which the agency described
as a "voluntary and democratic device."2' 76 The very last paragraph of the
TVA's 1947 Report declared that "[a]t a time when the American form of
government is being challenged throughout the world, [the TVA] provides
a significant demonstration of the methods of democracy, wherein free
citizens and their representative agencies of government at all levels work
together effectively in discharging their respective responsibilities. 2 77
By the 1950s the TVA faced a serious attack on its continued existence
because of its nature as a social planning and government ownership entity.
SURVEY GRAPHIC (Jun. 1940).
271 "ITE WIDENING OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY THROUGH TVA, supra note 269, at 2-3
(describing itself as "increasing material benefits that shall be enjoyed under a democratic
regime" where "the business of farming is still a private business" and opining that "the is-
sue of governmental action versus free enterprise is a thoroughly false and mythical issue").
272 TENN. VALLEY AUTH., TVA: 1941 1 (1941).
273 Id. at 2.
274 TENN. VALLEY AUTH., TENNESSEE VALLEY RESOURCES: THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND USE
81 (1947).
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277 Id. at 145.
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It struggled to survive "allegations of communism and dictatorship." '78
According to Julian Huxley, who wrote his observations of the TVA during
World War II, the agency was "sharply criticized by most Republicans and
many anti-New-Deal Democrats as un-American ... [and] as Socialism." '79
The TVA was, by some accounts, a "slice of Soviet Russia."'8 0 It was not the
best of years to be described as a planning authority.
E. National Defense & Narrowing the TVA Agenda
In some sense, the TVA's origin does align with American military
interests. Describing his initial foray into the problem of Muscle Shoals,
Norris said he approached the issue with "the feeling that congressional
proposals, relating to the ultimate disposition of Muscle Shoals, more
properly should have fallen to the Senate Military Affairs Committee." ''
In this comment, Norris, far from being a fan of military building,82 was
making practical note of the fact that military affairs were responsible for
acquiring the Muscle Shoals problem and therefore ought to be the first
responders when the deal went bad. The need to address the Tennessee
River's navigation issue was first recommended to President Monroe
by John C. Calhoun as Secretary of War in 1824, and the Muscle Shoals
development began not with a dam but with canals and locks to increase
river navigability. 83
At the same time, Senator Norris described the military acquisition
of Muscle Shoals in relation to the creation of the TVA as largely
happenstance." For Norris, the experiment in regional development
of a river valley would have occurred anyway; the military ownership of
the Muscle Shoals site simply led to its selection as the initial test case.
From the beginning, a portion of the TVA's purposes were allocated to the
national defense. While the Authority is "essentially a peacetime enterprise
... it has statutory obligations to produce materials required for the national
278 Charles McKinley, The Valley Authority and Its Alternatives, 44 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 607,
607 (1950).
279 JULIAN HUXLEY, TVA: ADVENTURE IN PLANNING 115 (1943). (internal quotation marks
omitted).
280 CLARENCE LEWIS HODGE, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY: A NATIONAL
EXPERIMENT IN REGIONALISM 51 (American University Press, 1938). (citation omitted).
281 NORRIS, supra note 227, at 246.
282 In fact, Norris was an isolationist who voted against entering the First World War.
See Norman L. Zucker, George W Norris: Nebraska Moralist, 42 NEB. HIsT., June 1961, at 95,96.
283 BD. OF DIRS., TENN. VALLEY AUTH., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE UNIFIED
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TENNESSEE RIVER SYSTEM 13 (1936).
284 See NORRIS, supra note 227, at 247-48. As Norris explains, the initial acquisition of
Muscle Shoals involved the production of elements necessary to the national defense, but
later it became clear that "there were other goals much to be desired." Id. at 247.
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defense." '85 The Act's purposes declared the TVA's duty "to provide for
the national defense by the creation of a corporation for the operation of
Government properties at and near Muscle Shoals." '86
Construction on the TVA's network of dams "began in the 1930's, [and]
then was rushed in the 1940's to meet wartime demands for hydroelectric
power." '87 At the end of 1940, due to national security concerns, the TVA
was authorized "to carry out an emergency construction program," adding
"approximately 300,000" kilowatts generating capacity. 88ATVA report from
1941 proclaimed that "TVA power answers the call of national defense." 89
The TVA explained its role by stating that in 1941 "[a]bout one third of
the commodities classified as strategic and critical by the Army and Navy
are available in the Tennessee Valley Area."" g The TVA accepted a strong
role in national defense, noting significant power production (3.6 billion
kilowatt hours per year by 1940) and reaffirming its electrical production
facilities' relationships with the Alabama Munitions Plant, the Electro-
Metallurgical Plant, Memphis Powder Plant, Columbia Electro-Chemical,
the TVA Phosphate Reserves, Alco Aluminum and Stinson Aircraft. 91
The TVA's largest role, however, was in the production of power for
other agencies to use in the national defense. The TVA desperately
needed more power-not for the local region or development, but for the
wartime effort. "During the war, approximately 75 percent of TVA's output
of electric power was used for war purposes[] and use of electricity for
nonessential purposes was discouraged." ' As a result, the TVA specifically
refused sale of power to other local agencies and gave preference to
wartime energy needs, contributing to places such as a local nitrate plant. 93
Congress expanded the TVA's authority to construct dams and generating
plants in 1941 based on the National Defense Advisory Commission's
strong recommendation."9 By 1950, the TVA reported that "the region's
power requirements were outgrowing the amount that could be supplied
from hydroelectric plants," and therefore it became necessary to turn to the
"abundant coal supplies in and near the region."' 95 While the TVA spoke of
285 TVA: 1941, supra note 272, at 27.
286 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, § 1, 48 Stat. 58, 58 (1933) (current version at
16 U.S.C. § 831).
287 TVA TODAY 1975, supra note 243, at 7.
288 TVA: 1941, supra note 272, at 27. For further details on the TVA's military support,
see TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, FACTS ABOUT THE TVA AND NATIONAL DEFENSE (194).
289 TVA: 1941, supra note 272, at iv.
290 Id. at xxiv.
291 See id.
292 TENNESSEE VALLEY RESOURCES: 'THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND USE, supra note 274, at 140.
293 TVA: 1941, supra note 272, at 27.
294 Id. at 12.
295 TVA TODAY 1975, supra note 243, at 28.
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the power needs of "the region," the data demonstrates that the majority of
the TVA's power production went specifically to military efforts.
As the TVA pushed to meet defense industry needs during the World
War II era, the agency expanded from hydroelectric power to steam
plants, which were coal-fired"9 and brought environmental and social
consequences for the region. The TVA "became a major buyer of coal in
the early 1950s," using 40 million tons per year of strip-mined coal, 97 and
by 1955 was "the chief source of federal electricity and the largest coal
customer in the nation."2 '' In 1950, coal-fired steam plants generated 10% of
the power created by the TVA, but by 1956, they generated approximately
72% of all TVA power output.299 Much of this expansion fed the Oak Ridge
facility. The Atomic Energy Commission accounted for less than 14% of the
TVA's total power sales in 1950. 30 By 1956, the Atomic Energy commission
accounted for 56% of TVA power sales. 301
Initially, the TVAs purposes were broadly outlined to include power
production and resource management, but also more generally a program
to promote the economic and social development of the Tennessee Valley
region. Thus, early commentators could say that "[t]he ultimate objective
of the Tennessee Valley Authority program, as defined by Congress, is to
promote the economic and social well-being of the people of the region."3 '
Yet the TVA's purpose quickly narrowed to one of primarily power
production and other forms of assistance to national defense needs. By
1941, a TVA report cited the national defense as at "the nucleus of the
present organization."3 3 By 1957, one commentator wrote, "The Act of 1933
projected a general program for the economic and social development of the
Valley under which substantial progress was made for almost twenty years.
In the last four years, however, the non-power programs have suffered both a
relative and an absolute decline."304 The TVA struggled to use its resources
to meet contradictory public demands. In the war years of the 1940s, and
expanding through the atomic development programs of the 1950s, the
TVA was barely able to meet the increasing energy demands placed upon
it, let alone work on non-power related programs.3 °5 Eventually, observers
296 Roscoe C. Martin, The Tennessee Valley Authority: A Study of Federal Control, 22 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRoBs., Winter 1957, at 351 , 364.
297 TVA TODAY 1975, supra note 243, at 42.
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299 Martin, supra note 296, at 364.
300 Id.
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302 T. Levron Howard, The Social Scientist in the Tennessee Valley Authority Program, 15 Soc.
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305 Id.
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could only conclude that "[tihe overwhelming fact is that in recent years
the TVA has become more and more an electric utility enterprise and less
and less a regional resource-development undertaking."3 °6 Social and local
programs were virtually dropped, and natural resources programs suffered
significantly in the TVA's remodeled mission.30 7
The TVA demonstrates how it is possible for divisive ambiguities of
scale to be latent through the legislative process and end up resulting
in ambiguous statutory mandates for agencies, thus creating programs
that may be subject to undemocratic shifts in their operational purpose.
Similarly, such latent ambiguities create troublesome legislative histories.
Even more problematically, even when there is no latent ambiguity among
supporters, the legislative history is likely to mention both local and larger
scale goods. Because a location-specific bill must gain support from a
sufficient majority to succeed, proponents are motivated to point to second-
tier goods that extend beyond the locality. As a consequence, if courts look
to the text only, the confluence of federalism and the common good canons
may push for national goods coming out of a location-specific program. On
the other hand, if courts look to the legislative history, even the history
of a bill meant primarily to provide location-specific goods is likely to be
ambiguous because location-specific goods will be supported by second-
tier national goods. Again, in this case, the confluence of federalism and
optimizing the common good may skew the analysis toward the national
scale, neglecting-or worse, sacrificing-the local.
CONCLUSION
Having treated each piece of scaled legislation as a one-off, we have
failed to recognize a congressional trend. These now prevalent pieces of
scaled legislation are uniquely susceptible to ambiguous interpretations
or misinterpretations because of latent scalar presumptions resulting from
the canon of the common good-particularly when it is paired with other
trends of including basic constitutional structures such as federalism within
the interpretive canon. This susceptibility may not even be remedied by
resort to the legislative history. Focus on specifics may allow latent scalar
ambiguities to flourish during the legislative process, creating conflicting
levels of common goods within the legislative history. In response to this
problem, I suggest that drafters of location-specific legislation be textually
explicit about the contemplated scale of public goods and the order of
priority of scales when the legislation distributes common goods across
multiple scales.
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For statutory interpretation more generally, I suggest that the
substantive interpretive canon should refer to the constitutional structure-
the federalism canon--only where there is a question of constitutionality
of a provision and not in the more general case of an inquiry regarding
competing interpretations. Where there is a location-specific legislative
text, I suggest that courts must look to the missing element of scale,
particularly in the context of determining the common good. I suggest that
if courts incorporate federalism into statutory interpretation on questions
beyond constitutionality, they are likely to distort location-specific
legislation by assuming that the common good is evaluated at the national
level, which opens the way to additional geographic inequalities due to
uneven distributions of burdens.
One approach would be to allow the federalism-common good push to
the national scale to be overridden by recognition of process federalism-
that states outside the benefitting region participated in the legislative
process, affirming first tier goods to be distributed on a regional basis.
Within this process, the federalist structure was affirmed even while goods
were being distributed at a scale that did not align specifically with the state
or national scale. Thus, there is no need to impose the federal structure
in retrospect to affect a rebalancing of the distribution of social goods. In
the end, although this article offers a cautionary tale, the conflicts outlined
herein also provide opportunities for using latent ambiguities of scale as a
method of generating dialogue between the courts and Congress on how
statutory interpretation might intersect with our continuing explorations of
the nature of federalism.

